Violent Profits: The Political Economy of Electoral Violence

Leonardo Arriola, University of California, Berkeley

Research Grant, 2015

---

This project examines the role of economic relationships in violence that often erupts during elections around the world. Multiparty elections are meant to provide citizens with a peaceful means for choosing elected leaders; however, in some countries, politicians and their allies regularly use violence to shape electoral processes and outcomes in their favor.

What has yet to be fully understood by scholars and policymakers is whether or how the nature of political-business relationships might affect the outbreak or targeting of election violence. When are business actors targeted by election violence? Does such violence affect the political behavior or preferences of business actors?

We find that shop owners and traders who belong to stronger market associations are less likely to witness election violence or to be threatened with violence. 

Using a multimethod strategy combining in-depth interviews and large-scale surveys, this project shows how business actors adapt to the use of violence during elections. Interviews with businesspeople, politicians, and civil society leaders suggest that businesses are highly sensitive to the economic costs associated with violence (e.g., business closures due to riots). However, some businesspeople still choose to support politicians who employ violent electoral tactics as a form of protection, using their ties to those politicians to insulate their businesses from violence during election campaigns while asking for favors in nonelection years. 

A survey conducted in Lagos, Nigeria, further shows that the experiences of over one-thousand shop owners and traders with electoral violence depend on their membership in market associations, which are often allied to political parties or candidates running for office. We find that shop owners and traders who belong to stronger market associations are less likely to witness election violence or to be threatened with violence. Instead, these association members are more likely to receive gifts (e.g., cash or food) during elections. Importantly, we find that both threats and gifts can increase the likelihood of voting among this set of business actors.