A New Kind of War: A History of the 1946–1949 Greek Civil War

Spyridon Tsoutsoumpis, Centre for Advanced Studies Sophia

Research Grant, 2017

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The grant provided by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation allowed me to study one of the lesser-known conflicts that took place in 20th-century Europe—the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). Existing studies have focused on the international dimension of the civil war, viewing it as a direct by-product of rivalry between the Soviet and Western camps. This research has therefore omitted to address several pertinent questions: How did ordinary civilians and combatants experience this conflict? What led soldiers from both sides of the divide to fight and endure the tribulations of warfare, deprivations, and fear? What was the impact of the civil war in local and national social and financial networks? What were the social and political legacies of the civil war? I ventured to challenge perceptions and address the gaps in the existing scholarship by examining the ground dynamics of the civil war.

The grant enabled me to conduct research in numerous archives and libraries in Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Britain. This extensive research served both to affirm my original hypothesis but also to open new avenues for enquiry. Archival evidence as well as published and unpublished testimonies indicated that the state and its allies lacked both the means and the willingness to pursue a civil conflict with the left. Moreover, the evidence showed that despite its pledge to demobilize, the left kept its clandestine structures intact and remained the de facto force in much of the countryside.

Ultimately the outbreak of the civil war was not the by-product of a grand conspiracy or a vindictive sect of ultraconservatives but rather the outcome of profound state weakness, the feebleness and inability to provide leadership of political elites on both sides of the divide, and an exceptionally polarized political culture.

The void in power and the inability of the state to address the problems of poverty, unemployment, and rampart criminality, as well as the obsessive fear of communism among the middle strata of the peasantry and the petit bourgeoisie led to the organization of multiple clandestine organizations that waged a low-key form of warfare against the left, which responded with its own brand of brutal counterviolence. Ultimately the outbreak of the civil war was not the by-product of a grand conspiracy or a vindictive sect of ultraconservatives but rather the outcome of profound state weakness, the feebleness and inability to provide leadership of political elites on both sides of the divide, and an exceptionally polarized political culture. 

The same weakness characterized the conduct of the civil war. This conflict has been conceptualized as a conventional conflict waged between two clearly demarcated camps. My research shows that the weakness of the state allowed the right-wing militias to persevere and morph into large, powerful organizations that exercised their own form of rough justice in the countryside. Many of these groups acted in a mafia-like capacity, extorting and robbing civilians of all political persuasions and using their force to pursue private and political vendettas. The presence of the militias accelerated the pace of conflict and led to unprecedented levels of violence as the civil war fragmented into a myriad of local conflicts waged by private militias, gangs, and insurgent bands who fought over control of rents and  resources and used their arms to settle local scores.

The situation changed after the advent of the Marshall Plan. US aid allowed the state to reorganize its forces and helped the government to re-equip and retrain the army that had suffered considerable setbacks at the hands of the insurgents. However, government victory was not the simple product of brutish violence and overwhelming military superiority. US funds also allowed the government and the army to engage in extensive state-building and to set the foundations of the welfare state. The military engaged in widespread “hearts and minds” operations by providing medical aid and food and by rebuilding the shattered infrastructure across the countryside. These operations had a positive impact on the lives and prospects of civilians and soldiers alike. Ultimately, the government won because it was able to build and provide a plausible alternative to the utopian program of the left. This helped both to provide legitimacy for the badly battered administration and gradually delegitimize the political program of the insurgents.

What difference do these findings make to our understanding of the history of the Greek Civil War and more broadly of civil conflicts in 20th-century Europe? First, they demonstrate the importance of local and national cleavages and point to the need for more rigorous microresearch into the foundations of warfare. Secondly, they demonstrate the salience and role of nonstate actors in the conduct of civil wars. Finally, they exhibit the enduring role of hearts-and-minds operations and the importance of adopting humane and flexible policies rather than overwhelming force when faced with radical insurgencies.