Ordinary Soldiers? A Case Study of the Nazi-Soviet War of Annihilation

David Wildermuth, Shippensburg University

Research Grant, 2018

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While the myth of the “clean Wehrmacht” about the German Army under National Socialism, was largely dispelled in the 1990s, this shift was accomplished without the benefit of an in-depth understanding of the individual histories of the majority of the army’s front-line combat units. Especially absent was an understanding of how front-line units interacted with the Soviet civilian population under their control.

My case study investigated the German Army’s 35^th Infantry Division to contextualize how one front-line combat unit fought this “war of annihilation.” The history of this infantry division that fought on the eastern front for the entire duration of the war lends itself to deducing the typical experiences of German front-line combat divisions during this conflict.

The extensive combat record of the division reveals many examples of extreme violence. 

Within this case study, there were two primary research questions. First, in studying the division’s combat record, what examples of extreme violence, most often understood as war crimes or crimes against humanity, can be quantified and/or explained? And second, what was the extent and nature of the contact between this front-line division and the civilian population of the Soviet Union?

The extensive combat record of the division reveals many examples of extreme violence. I found repeated instances of the summary execution of Red Army political commissars and the shooting of Red Army prisoners of war by the division. Additionally, the division’s treatment of prisoners of war, both in times of intense combat and times of relative quiet, violated international conventions observed in other campaigns.

Not all of these examples of extreme violence can be linked to orders, and some are more reflective of a front-line culture which could deviate from the military culture fostered by the divisional leadership. A further finding of my research was that soldiers and officers at times demonstrated some latitude in fulfilling orders, and even did contest certain orders involving their own physical danger. Criminal orders such as the scorched earth policy accompanying the winter 1941 retreats, however, were fully executed. Additionally, personal pressure could be brought to bear on recalcitrant officers or soldiers to adhere to draconian policies such as the unofficial “no pardon” orders issued repeatedly in 1941.

The context of the war—whether the 35^th Division was advancing, retreating, or stationary, and whether the front line was a place of intense combat or relative quiet—greatly informed the relationship between the division’s soldiers and the civilian population. With a full combat strength of over 17,000, the 35^th Division fought in largely agrarian regions whose towns and villages could not support its existential needs. In 1941 in Wassiljewa and  in 1942–43 near Gshatsk, longer deployments coupled with an entirely inadequate German supply system translated to suffocating burdens on the local population.

By the fall of 1941, neglect of the civilian population and/or its limited expropriation had turned into widespread plundering. Whenever divisional casualties mounted and the position of the 35^th Division became increasingly fraught, Soviet civilians were ruthlessly exploited as slave labor to improve the division’s situation. Orders from divisional command to the rank and file that called for a more moderate approach to the treatment of the civilian population, both in terms of comportment and requisitioning, were often disregarded. However, Soviet sources show some examples of leniency and even kindness towards the Soviet civilian population, demonstrating the limits of National Socialist Blut-und-Boden ideology as a motivator of soldiers’ behavior.