Endocrine Disruption of Aggression: What We Can Learn About Humans by Studying Fish

Ethan D. Clotfelter, Biology, Amherst College

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Research Grant, 2006

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Hundreds of chemicals are known to interfere with the vertebrate endocrine system. These endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) differ from more traditional toxins in that they have myriad sublethal behavioral and physiological effects. One endpoint that is frequently affected by endocrine disruption is aggressive behavior, due to its underlying hormonal basis. Fortunately, because the endocrine system is remarkably conserved among vertebrates, we can study the effects of EDCs on aggression in relatively simple animals such as fish.

This study focused on EDCs called phytoestrogens, which are plant compounds that are structurally similar to our endogenous estrogens. Phytoestrogens are released into the environment wherever plant material is processed and concentrated, including sewage treatment plants, agricultural fields, and wood pulp mills. Humans are exposed to phytoestrogens via dietary sources such as soybeans, chickpeas, and flaxseed. My laboratory uses the fighting fish Betta splendens, a species well-known for its stereotyped aggressive displays, as a research organism with which to evaluate the effects of phytoestrogens on vertebrate behavior and physiology.

In our first experiments, my students and I exposed male B. splendens to the following concentrations of waterborne phytoestrogens using a 28-day semistatic experimental design: 17β-estradiol (an endogenous estrogen that we used as a positive control; 10, 100, 1000, and 10,000 ng/L), genistein (1, 10, 100, 1000 µg/L), equol (10, 100, 1000 µg/L), or β-sitosterol (10, 100, 1000 µg/L). The lower concentrations of each chemical are similar to those that animals experience in nature. Aggressive behavior in response to a mirror stimulus, a common index of agonistic behavior in fishes, was significantly decreased in several of the phytoestrogen treatment groups. These changes in behavior were not the result, however, of decreased overall activity, as we found no effects of phytoestrogens on spontaneous swimming behavior.

The decrease in 11-KT and the increases in serotonergic and dopaminergic activity are all consistent with the behavioral results we obtained.

In order to explain these changes in aggression, we examined two probable physiological mechanisms: sex steroid hormones in the bloodstream and neurotransmitters in the brain. With respect to steroid hormones, we assayed levels of the primary fish androgen, 11-ketotestosterone (11-KT), and found that fish exposed to phytoestrogens for 28 days had decreased 11-KT levels. More specifically, we found that genistein and 17β-estradiol (positive control) caused slight reductions in circulating 11-KT levels, while β-sitosterol significantly decreased concentrations of this androgen. To address the second question, we measured the concentration and metabolism of serotonin and dopamine, two monoamine neurotransmitters known to modulate aggressive behavior in vertebrates. We found that: (i) 17β-estradiol and β-sitosterol increased serotonin metabolism to its primary metabolite (5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid), (ii) equol and genistein increased dopamine levels, and (iii) β-sitosterol increased dopamine metabolism to its primary metabolite (3, 4-dihydroxyphenylacetic acid). The decrease in 11-KT and the increases in serotonergic and dopaminergic activity are all consistent with the behavioral results we obtained.

The significance of these findings is that low doses of phytoestrogens are capable of altering species-typical aggressive behavior in vertebrates by interfering with the normal functioning of the neuroendocrine system. The implication for humans is that elevated phytoestrogen consumption, whether through the diet or dietary supplements, has the potential to cause subtle yet significant physiological—and perhaps behavioral—changes.

White Terror: Paramilitary Violence in Interwar Central Europe

Robert Gerwarth, History, University of Oxford

Research Grant, 2006, 2007

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The research grant from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation enabled me to explore the history of paramilitary violence in Central Europe after the Great War. My aim was to challenge the dominant nation-centric approaches to the history of violent right-wing movements in early interwar Germany, Austria, and Hungary by adopting a transnational approach that conceptualizes post-1918 Central Europe as a “zone of violence” that was conditioned by the experiences of military defeat, revolution, and territorial disintegration (or amputation).

The HFG research grant enabled me to undertake extensive primary research in this field and to test the wider methodological implications of my hypothesis for our understanding of political violence more generally. I undertook several extended trips to various Central European archives replete with documents dealing with the violent aftermath of World War I. In addition to the accumulation of a vast amount of press clippings on the subject matter, I collected memoirs and diaries of over one hundred perpetrators and victims of the so-called “White Terror” from the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv Berlin), the Staatsarchiv Freiburg, the Landesarchivs Baden-Württemberg, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich), the NIOD (Amsterdam), the Special Archive (Moscow), the Hungarian National Archives and the Military Archive in Budapest, and the Österreichische Staatsarchiv, as well as the state archives in Innsbruck, Graz, and Vienna.

This extensive research confirmed my original hypothesis that the three major successor states of the Central European Empires witnessed the emergence of a transnational subculture of paramilitary activists that was shaped by the successive traumatizing experiences of defeat, revolution, and territorial disintegration, experiences which all three countries shared. In that respect, it was not so much the experience of the Great War (an experience also shared by the Western Allies, which managed the transition from war to peace with considerably less bloodshed) as George Mosse famously argued, but the peculiar combination of defeat and revolution that triggered an ultraviolence response from the Central European right.

The counterrevolutionary activists that formed this paramilitary subculture were in direct contact with each other, building on connections established during the war, negotiating ways of co-operation, and exchanging ideas and personnel.

Although important differences existed in terms of individual motivations for joining paramilitary groups, these differences were by no means nation-specific. The activists involved in paramilitary activities in all three countries shared a determination to use ultraviolence in order to suppress the revolutionary threat and to avenge their perceived humiliations at the hands of external and internal enemies. Their ultraviolence, made possible by a temporary breakdown of legal authority, was both destructive and creative as it helped to establish new transnational subcultures of perpetrators and victims within Central Europe.

Despite a high degree of ideological fragmentation within the political right of Central Europe, the counterrevolutionary activists in all three countries agreed on the primary aim of restoring “order” through violence and identified the same groups as their enemies in what was effectively a transnational civil war. Everywhere in the region, anti-Bolshevism, anti-Semitism and antifeminism operated as touchstones for paramilitary movements. Their violent retribution was not merely seen as a politically necessary act of self-defense in order to suppress the communist revolts of Central Europe, but also as a positive value in itself that distinguished the activists from the “indifferent” and “cowardly” majority of bourgeois society unwilling to rise up in the face of revolution and defeat. Ever since the military collapse of the Central European Empires in November 1918 and the subsequent revolutions in Berlin, Budapest, and Vienna, the counterrevolutionary activists that formed this paramilitary subculture were in direct contact with each other, building on connections established during the war, negotiating ways of co-operation, and exchanging ideas and personnel.

What difference do these findings make to our understanding of the history of paramilitary violence in Central Europe after the Great War? Although the concept of “transnationality” has come to dominate the most recent historiography of twentieth-century Central Europe, the vast majority of historians working in the field have focused on the important, but rather obvious subjects of, for example, (forced or voluntary) migration, religion, or tourism as forms of cross-cultural encounter and interaction. Yet, ethnic conflict, war and civil war, were, perhaps, the most defining transnational experiences in the region during much of the twentieth century and they, too, contributed to a vast array of contacts and transfers of ideas and personnel across real or imagined borders. The ultraviolence of the immediate postwar period was instrumental in forging new transnational milieus of perpetrators and victims whose interaction across national borders was an important characteristic of Central European history in the period and would remain so in different guises until the radical reshaping of Central European frontiers and populations in the aftermath of 1945.

Violent Street Groups and Organized Crime in Russia

Svetlana Stephenson, International Comparative Sociology, London Metropolitan University

Research Grant, 2005, 2006

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Youth violence remains a stark problem in many Russian cities, as does the presence of organized criminal gangs. Do violent practices serve to “embed” young people in criminality and facilitate their transition to membership in organized criminal groups, or are they just a feature of male street socialization? Can violence come to be regulated from below in the course of group transformation and change in the economic and political climate?

To answer these questions, I, together with my Russian collaborators, conducted in-depth interviews and focus groups with young people who were members of violent territorial street groups in two major Russian cities, Kazan and Moscow, as well as with representatives of the local police, youth workers, teachers and parents.

Do violent practices serve to "embed" young people in criminality and facilitate their transition to membership in organized criminal groups, or are they just a feature of male street socialization? 

This research revealed substantial differences in the social organization of street youth in these cities and the aspirations of their members. Most of the Kazan gangs are entrepreneurial gangs, whose members tend to graduate into organized criminal groups when they grow older. These groups have developed a sophisticated system of regulation of violence, which has allowed them to reap substantial economic benefits through racketeering and informal control of the local businesses. Their domination over nongang young people and small businessmen, who are forced to pay their “dues,” is based upon the use of verbal and physical violence and effective construction of their groups as the street elite. The violent practices have changed over time. At the end of the 1980s the gangs battled for the local supremacy, and this created high levels of violence. But, as they have demarcated their borders and created stable structures of authority and command, levels of violence have subsided. Eruptions of uncontrolled violence are now an obstacle to the gangs’ business aims, and the gangs try to limit fights and conflict on their territory. They have also developed mutually beneficial connections with representatives of the local police, which also acts to limit the violence. As the economic and political situation in Russia has stabilized, the gang members increasingly aspire to careers in mainstream society, combined with participation in organized crime networks.

The situation in Moscow is different. In this economically prosperous and socially diverse city, more or less stable territorial groups emerge only at the outskirts of the city. As in Kazan, young people have also developed their strategies of territorial domination, which include the harassment of nongang young people and representatives of ethnic and sexual minorities. But they tend not to engage in racketeering and other violent entrepreneurial activities to the same extent. The majority of the members of street groups see their membership as a necessary stage in their masculine socialization. They learn to create a powerful physical presence on the street, develop the skills of verbal domination and accumulate the knowledge of norms and rituals associated with cultural perceptions of dominant masculinity. For only a minority of them are street violence and crime steps towards affiliation into the structures of organized crime. This is also true for some homeless young men, who form their own street groups. They aspire to join organized crime, which they see as the only realistic way out of homelessness, and which can guarantee them some stability and social membership. Violence at the outskirts of Moscow is highly ritualized, and it bears the traditions of the Russian village fights, with their prohibitions of attacks against women and children and a specific street “code” of fighting.

Bibliography

1. Stephenson, S. "Kazanskii Leviathan: Molodyozhnie Territorialnie Gruppirovki i Problema Sotsialnogo Poriadka" [The Kazan Leviathan: Youth Territorial Gangs and the Problem of Social Order]. Otechestvennie Zapiski 30.3 (2006): 97-110.

2. Stephenson, S. "Rebiata s Nashego Dvora. Podrostkovo-molodyozhnie gruppirovki v Moskve" [The guys from our courtyard. Youth groups in Moscow]. Ethnograficheskie Obozrenie. (Forthcoming)

3. Two English-language papers are being written.
   

The Kayapo Conjuncture: An Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance with International Civil Society Against Violence and Rights Abuse by the State and National Security

Terence Turner, Anthropology, University of Chicago

Research Grant, 1997, 1999

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The 1990s brought an intensification of efforts to extract the natural resources of the Amazon (mining, especially of gold; logging of tropical hardwoods; the clearing and burning of large tracts of forest by agribusiness and cattle ranching interests; big highway construction projects that brought uncontrolled influxes of settlers and further deforestation; and vast hydroelectric dam schemes that threatened to destroy fisheries and flood huge areas) that were fostered by the Brazilian state, whose developmentalist policies were driven in large part by pressure from global financial institutions and foreign governments to reduce Brazil’s huge debt and trade deficit. Standing in the path of these projects were scattered indigenous peoples and communities of regional Brazilian settlers. These groups were unorganized, poor, and in many cases relatively unacculturated. To most observers, they seemed about to be overwhelmed and pushed off their land, as their forest habitat was burned around them and their rivers dammed and polluted by mining operations.

The performance and achievements of the Kayapo and the conjuncture of forces of which they were able to make themselves the focus during this period was nothing short of spectacular.

As an anthropologist who had been studying one of the most important indigenous Amazonian peoples, the Kayapo, since 1962, it seemed to me that the prophecies of doom were premature. I had observed that beginning in the mid-1970s, the Kayapo had been taking the measure of the threats to their ecosystem and the survival of their communities and culture, and acquiring the resources and contacts to confront and deflect or defeat them. I thought that chronicling and analyzing their struggles in the climactic decade of the mid-90s to mid-2000s might have general implications for the conventional wisdom of developmentalist theory, anthropological and political science treatments of the relation of marginal and ‘weak’ populations and ethnic groups to globalization and state-sponsored development, and might also serve as an example for other indigenous and regional settler groups contending with the same forces. In a number of field trips made possible by the grant, I was able to document, and to a considerable extent theorize, the processes through which the Kayapo were able to transform their own social and political structure to form a united front to regain control of their extensive traditional territory, make a series of interethnic alliances with other indigenous and Brazilian settler groups, attract the support of national and international civil society (in the form of nongovernmental organizations devoted to environmental conservation, human rights, and indigenous support), and important sectors of the Brazilian state itself (such as the judicial system, parts of the federal bureaucracy, and elected members of the national congress) as well as important coverage in the media and the scientific and academic establishment. This was the conjuncture I proposed to study: I was fortunate that so much of it developed and exerted its effects in the period supported by the grant. The performance and achievements of the Kayapo and the conjuncture of forces of which they were able to make themselves the focus during this period was nothing short of spectacular, and has continued to be so down to the time of this writing. I believe that the account of their achievements and the analysis of the factors and processes that have made them possible that I have been able to work out and publish with the support of the grant have had (at least to some extent) the more general effects on developmentalist thinking and anthropological theory for which I hoped.

In all, the research made possible by the grant has directly or indirectly produced twenty published articles and reports, and either directly supported or laid the foundation for nine trips to Kayapo communities, or in a couple of cases to the offices and archives of Brazilian governmental and nongovernmental agencies concerned with the Kayapo, located in Brasilia and Sao Paulo. A selected list of articles follows, including a recently published piece which although it is later than the period covered by the grant does draw together most of the main issues addressed by the research.

Bibliography

1. Turner, Terence. "Extrativismo mineral por e para comunidades indígenas da Amazônia: a experiência entre os Waiãpi do Amapá e os Kaiapó do sul do Pará" [Mineral extraction by and for indigenous Amazonian Communities: Gold Mining by the Wayampi and Kayapo]. Cadernos do Campo, Sao Paulo, (1998).

2. Turner, Terence. "Indigenous and culturalist movements in the contemporary global conjuncture." In Francisco F. Del Riego, Marcial G. Portasany, Terence Turner, Josep R. Llobera, Isodoro Moreno, and James W. Fernandez. Las identidades y las tensiones culturales de modernidad,1999.

3. Turner, Terence. "Indigenous rights, environmental protection and the struggle over forest resources in the Amazon: the case of the Brazilian Kayapo." In Jill Conway, Kenneth Keniston, and Leo Marx, eds., Earth, air, fire and water: the humanities and the environment, 2000.

4. Turner, Terence and Fajans-Turner, Vanessa. "Political innovation and inter-ethnic alliance: Kayapo resistance to the developmentalist state." Anthropology Today 22(5) (2006):3-10.

Identifying Genes Responsible for a Highly Heritable Aspect of Antisocial Behavior in 7-Year-Old Children

Robert Plomin, Behavioral Genetics, King's College London

Research Grant, 2004

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Our recent work on the genetic basis of antisocial behavior has concentrated on defining the most heritable antisocial behavior phenotype for molecular genetic analyses. We have now repeatedly demonstrated that while antisocial behavior with co-occurring psychopathic traits is highly heritable, antisocial behavior without psychopathic traits is not (Viding, Blair, Moffitt, & Plomin, 2005; Viding, Jones, Frick, Moffitt, & Plomin, 2006). In addition, multivariate twin model-fitting work has demonstrated considerable genetic overlap between antisocial behavior and psychopathic traits (Viding, Frick, & Plomin, in press). This essential twin analysis work has been instrumental in validating appropriate targets for molecular genetic analyses.

We have now repeatedly demonstrated that while antisocial behavior with co-occurring psychopathic traits is highly heritable, antisocial behavior without psychopathic traits is not.

Based on our repeated finding of the high heritability of psychopathic antisocial behavior, as well as our multivariate results, the following approaches are being taken with our molecular genetic analyses.

1) Using the TEDS sample, we have replicated recent findings of association between a particular genotype (COMT) and antisocial behavior in children with high levels of hyperactivity (Thapar et al., 2005). This association did not hold for psychopathic traits, indicating that COMT may be a candidate gene for impulsive, rather than premeditated type of antisocial behavior. These findings are currently being prepared for publication.

2) Our DNA pooling study is ongoing. Given the costs associated with such study, we wanted to perform additional twin analyses in order to optimize the sample selection. Based on the findings from our twin analysis, we are now conducting a DNA pooling study on individuals with high levels of BOTH antisocial behavior and callous-unemotional traits. We also wanted to wait for the development of more powerful Affymetrix SNP microarray (GeneChip), which we discovered was in the pipeline soon after we received the Guggenheim funding. The new Affymetrix GeneChip can be used to genotype 500,000 DNA markers (SNPs), which is sufficient to scan the entire genome. We have continued to develop our use of pooled DNA genotyped on GeneChips (Butcher et al., in press; Meaburn et al., 2005, 2006), which we use to screen the 500,000 SNPs and then follow up on nominated SNPs with individual genotyping. Given the extra costs of the new GeneChip, we have also obtained additional money to supplement the funds provided by the Guggenheim Foundation.

Bibliography

1. Butcher, L. M., Schalkwyk, L., & Plomin, R. "Applicability of DNA pools on 500K SNP microarrays for cost-effective initial screens in genomewide association studies." Nucleic Acids Research. (In press.)

2. Meaburn, E., Butcher, L. M., Schalkwyk, L. C., & Plomin, R. "Genotyping pooled DNA using 100K SNP microarrays: A step towards genomewide association scans." Nucleic Acids Research 34 (2006): e27.

3. Thapar A., Langley K., Fowler T., Rice F., Turic D., Whittinger N., Aggleton J., Van den Bree M., Owen M., O'Donovan M. "Catechol O-methyltransferase gene variant and birth weight predict early-onset antisocial behavior in children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder." Arch Gen Psychiatry 62(11) (Nov. 2005): 1275-8.

4. Viding, E., Blair, R. J. R., Moffitt, T. E., & Plomin, R. "Evidence for substantial genetic risk for psychopathy in 7-year-olds." Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 6 (2005): 592-597.

5. Viding, E., Frick, P., & Plomin, R. "Genetic contribution to psychopathic personality traits in children." In Biology of Personality and Individual Differences, edited by T. Canli. (In press.)

6. Viding, E., Jones, A., Frick, P., Moffitt, T., Plomin, R. "Heritability of antisocial behaviour at nine: Do callous-unemotional traits matter?" Developmental Science. Under review, 2006.

Gangs, Violence, and the Redivision of Space in Chicago

John Hagedorn, Criminal Justice, University of Illinois, Chicago

Research Grant, 2002

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Recent declines in homicide in Chicago have been seen as similar to earlier declines in New York City and Los Angeles. Popular explanations that policing strategies largely explain variation in rates of violence have been skeptically greeted by criminologists. However, no plausible explanation for persisting high rates of homicide in some cities and very low rates in others has been credibly presented. One reason for this may be the narrowness of criminological investigations. Explanations for violence internationally have included human rights, housing, and economic development among other variables. This essay presents data from a study on homicide in Chicago and supplements criminological thinking on homicide by adding insights from urban and globalization research.

This essay presents data from a study on homicide in Chicago and supplements criminological thinking on homicide by adding insights from urban and globalization research.

Bibliography

1. Hagedorn, John and Rauch, Brigid. "Housing, Gangs, and Homicide: What We can Learn from Chicago."Urban Affairs Review 42:4 (March 2007): 435- 456.

2. Hagedorn, John (ed.). Gangs and the Global City: Alternatives to Traditional Criminology. University of Illinois Press, 2006.

3. Hagedorn, John. A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gangsta Rap Culture. University of Minnesota Press, 2007.

Distinctive Characteristics of Marital Violence

Richard Felson, Sociology, The Pennsylvania State University

Research Grant, 2004

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The study of violence has become increasingly specialized. Researchers and policy makers focus on such topics as domestic violence, sexual assault, or violence between strangers. Specialization can be beneficial, but it may also inhibit our understanding of violent behavior. For example, perhaps some of the patterns observed in domestic violence occur in any type of violent encounter or in any violent encounter between people who know each other. Perhaps men’s violence against their wives is similar in many ways to their violence against others. Only by examining violence involving both genders in a variety of relationships can we determine how particular forms of violence are special. Only by examining the larger context can we discover when theories of domestic violence, theories of violence against women, or general theories of violence or aggression, are more useful.

We examined these issues using a large national victimization survey. In one of our studies we examined the ways in which assaults committed by male intimate partners are more serious than assaults committed by female partners and whether these differences reflect gender differences in offending and victimization generally (Felson and Cares, 2005). In general, gender effects do not depend on the victim’s relationship to the offender. Regardless of their relationship: (a) men cause more injuries; (b) women suffer more injuries although their injuries tend to be less severe; (c) victims are more fearful of male offenders, but only if the offenders are unarmed; and (d) men are particularly likely to precipitate assaults by other men, not their female partners. Violent husbands do assault with particularly high frequency but so do women who assault family members.

In general, gender effects do not depend on the victim's relationship to the offender.

We also examined the role of alcohol intoxication in different types of violent incidents (Felson, Burchfield, and Teasdale, unpublished). Analyses indicate that offenders are much more likely to be intoxicated when they physically assault a stranger than when they assault someone they know and least likely to be intoxicated when they assault an intimate partner. We argue that conflicts involving people who know each other are more intense and may lead to an assault without the facilitative effect of alcohol. We find no support for the idea that offenders who commit sexual assaults are more likely to be drinking than offenders who commit physical assaults.

Finally we examined whether when people are intoxicated they increase the likelihood that they will become victims of physical or sexual assaults. Analyses showed that the frequency and amount of alcohol people consume increases greatly their risk of victimization when drinking, but it is not associated with victimization while sober. This evidence suggests that drinking has a causal effect on victimization. We also find that men, young adults, and less-educated respondents are at a particularly high risk of victimization when drinking, controlling for how frequently they drink. Evidently, some demographic groups behave more provocatively than others when they are intoxicated.

Bibliography

1. Felson, Richard B., Keri Burchfield, and Brent Teasdale. The impact of Alcohol on Different types of Violent Incidents (unpublished).

2. Felson, Richard B. and Keri Burchfield. "Alcohol and the Risk of Physical and Sexual Assault Victimizations." Criminology 42(4) (November 2004): 837-858.

3. Felson, Richard B. and Alison C. Cares. "Gender and the Seriousness of Assaults on Intimate Partners and Other Victims." Journal of Marriage and Family 67 (December 2005): 1182-1195.

Strategic Observers Underground: How They See Trouble and What They Do Next

Harvey Molotch, Sociology, New York University

Research Grant, 2005

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Following Jane Jacobs’s observations of the role of “public characters” as a mechanism for heading off city crime and street violence, we asked just how such individuals actually do their work of keeping the peace. We interviewed seventy New York City subway workers and directly observed at worksites. While not an official part of the security apparatus, such individuals—”strategic observers” in our parlance—link local scenes with more distant authority structures. Through the lens of exigencies in the work setting and anticipated organizational reaction, we asked how noticing occurs and the range of actions workers take.

Workers develop acute familiarities with their work environments—even through areas they just pass by in work tasks. In managing danger in their workplace (on trains and in stations), they respond to emergent conditions with a high degree of inventiveness, while also dealing with official organizational rules. Conductors, for example, must hold their eyes on certain prescribed spots on platforms, as per subway regulations. They do so unfailingly, our observations suggest. But they also, in the context of that constraint, inspect platforms and trains for troubles. This more informal search follows past experience (and stories from other workers) that inform them of a particular repertoire of problems likely to evolve—e.g. drunks bothering other passengers, potential suicides, rowdy teenagers crowding turnstiles in a dangerous way. Workers evaluate what they see and what they should see through these twin lenses—those of formal requirements and those of routine troubles.

Through the lens of exigencies in the work setting and anticipated organizational reaction, we asked how noticing occurs and the range of actions workers take.

Subway workers tend to operate in isolation, both from one another and also from supervisors. Although they do sometimes call for help (from police via supervisors), they do so sparingly. If they consistently called for outside help, they would overwhelm the helping system and also risk holding up the trains. There are also specific perverse incentives. Workers do not want to risk sanction for unrelated misdeeds, like wearing an unauthorized clothing item that responding authorities discover on their person. Nor do they want to risk being late getting home by having to fill in a special report. They strive to call in authorities in ways that do not interfere with the running of the trains or accomplishing other needs, some related to their personal safety and some to their job enhancement.

Linked into accomplishing all such goals is creative manipulation of workplace equipment and infrastructure, including such items as train doors, horns, and braking tools. Whatever the designated official function, workers repurpose physical equipment to protect their own bodies and to discipline unruly passengers or prod people toward appropriate behaviors.

Our findings suggest that “public characters” are linked into complex organizational contexts which structure how they see, how they evaluate, and what they do next. These contexts vary, in ways we indicate, in how they enable informal vigilance in the production of public peace and the functioning of urban infrastructure.

Bibliography

1. Molotch, Harvey and Mcclain, Noah. "Things at Work: Informal social-material mechanisms for getting the job done." Journal of Consumer Culture 8.1 (2008): 35-67.

Political Violence, Military Conflict and Civil Unrest in Palestine: The Palestinian Police, the Fatah Tanzim and the “Al-Aqsa Intifada”

Nur Masalha, Political History of the Middle East, Saint Mary's University of Surrey

Research Grant, 2002, 2003

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This research project was originally undertaken with the aim of examining the roles played by the military and civilian police forces of the Palestinian Authority, and the popular militias (in particular the Fatah Tanzim), during the current uprising (“Al-Aqsa Intifada”) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was particularly intended to focus on the likely future trajectories of these organizations, the factors determining the dynamics between them, and the various options for their future evolution. The project outlined a number of research objectives relating both to the Palestinian police and to the popular militias and raised a number of hypotheses about the relationship between these forces; between these forces and the Palestinian Authority; and between these forces and the local population.

The research began by examining the pre–Al-Aqsa Intifada period, focusing on the post-1993 state formation in Palestine and the roles played by the Palestinian Police and Security Forces in the pre-Intifada period between 1994 and September 2000. The work then proceeded to examine the causes for outbreak and subsequent militarization of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the rise of the Fatah Tanzim, and the emergence of the Palestinian popular militias in 2001 and 2002.

During the course of the research, the situation in Palestine changed dramatically. Throughout 2002 and 2003, the project continued to monitor ongoing developments on the ground as they affected the research, and to modify the goals accordingly. Despite the deteriorating security situation in Palestine, which made visits to many parts of the country difficult, field trips to Jerusalem, Ramallah. and Bethlehem were extremely useful in conducting interviews and collecting primary and secondary material in Arabic and Hebrew.

The police as an institution engaged in very little armed resistance. Most of the resistance put up by the Palestinian population was led by the militias (Fatah Tanzim, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad).

Of particular importance was the strategy demonstrated by the Israeli government under Ariel Sharon, of semipermanent military reoccupation of the West Bank, which seemed to be aimed at the very destruction of the Palestinian Authority itself. The research attempted to measure and assess the effect of the ongoing reoccupation on the ability to respond of the Palestinian security forces and the militias, and concluded that the Israeli assault on the official Palestine Police (the destruction of police stations and police facilities throughout the occupied territories), contributed to the rise of the popular militias and armed units, including those of the Fatah Tanzim, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade and militant Islamic organizations (including Hamas and Islamic Jihad).

During its reoccupation of the West Bank, the Israeli army targeted the security organizations of the Palestinian Authority, particularly the police, and police posts and police stations were repeatedly destroyed and the police killed or arrested in very large numbers. The police as an institution engaged in very little armed resistance. Most of the resistance put up by the Palestinian population was led by the militias (Fatah Tanzim, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad).

The decreasing ability of the Palestinian Authority to function, on the security or any other level, resulted from the Sharon government’s underlying strategy of preventing the emergence of a viable Palestinian state. This in turn led to the development of a degree of skepticism among the Palestinian population about the Palestinian Authority’s future and the future of the two-state solution in general.

Among the specific new factors which the research identified as key are the following:

a) the tendency of the popular Palestinian militias to look to the example of the Lebanese Hizbullah and its tactics in confronting the Israeli army in south Lebanon;
b) the rise in levels of support for the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade among the population;
c) the close collaboration and a certain degree of merging between Islamist and nationalist forces and between these groups and the official police;
d) the occasional adoption by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, which had a secular nationalist tendency, of the tactic of suicide attacks which had hitherto been confined to Islamic groups;
e) evidence of an increasing traumatization of Palestinian society (see points d and f.);
f) the participation of Palestinian women in armed attacks in both secular nationalist and Islamist armed groups, including in suicide attacks;
g) the serious implications of the Brigade’s activities in terms of undermining the Palestinian Authority.

Hardships and Violence against Street Children in Sub-Saharan African Cities: Understanding Street Children and Street Life in Urban Tanzania

Joe L. P. Lugalla, Anthropology, University of New Hampshire

Research Grant, 1999, 2000

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One of the most recent social problems dominant in cities in sub-Saharan Africa is the rapid increase in the number of unsupervised children living or working on the streets. Most of these children, for various reasons, have either abandoned or have been abandoned by their families and have migrated to urban areas in order to earn a living. Their rapid increase, how they survive and grow up as young adults, the hardships they experience, and the types of violence they endure, raise concern and calls for immediate attention. Our study set out to examine the dynamics of street children’s lives in Dar-es-Salaam. The aim was to advance knowledge and understanding of the situation of poor children who live independently on the streets of sub-Saharan African cities by addressing the questions posed above. We explored the factors that push children onto the streets and examined the nature of their street life and how they cope with the situation. We also examined the hardships and violence they endure and how this affects their health.

Contrary to the conventional belief that street children are young criminals in the making, our study found out that most of these children are pushed onto streets by societal factors beyond their control.

The findings of this study suggest that rural poverty, abuse, and the scourge of HIV/AIDS act simultaneously in manufacturing a great number of helpless children who resort to street life. While on the streets, street children experience a rough life associated with the lack of basic necessities of life like shelter, food, health, education, and others. Both adult urban residents and law enforcement institutions regard them as criminals and most of them experience general violence and, for girls, sexual violence tends to be the routine of life. The study argues that street life has tremendous negative consequences on children’s health. Contrary to the conventional belief that street children are young criminals in the making, our study found out that most of these children are pushed onto streets by societal factors beyond their control. Street children are the neediest children in urban Africa and also the least assisted. The study concludes by detailing down-to-earth short- and long-term interventions that focus on addressing rampant rural poverty and controlling HIV/AIDS. We also recommend the formulation of policies that seek to improve the welfare of vulnerable social groups like women, street children, and children who have been orphaned by AIDS or other factors.

Bibliography

1. Lugalla, Joe L.P. and Colleta G. Kibassa. Urban Life and Street Children's Health: Children's Accounts of Urban Hardships and Violence in Tanzania. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2003.