The Middle Eastern Military as a Factor in Domestic and Regional Conflict and Violence: A Case Study of the Iranian Army

Stephanie Cronin, History, University of London

Research Grant, 1999

---

The research project consisted of a case study of the political and social role played by the Iranian army in the recent history both of Iran itself and of the Persian Gulf region. Beginning with the collapse of the army following Riza Shah’s abdication in 1941, my research dealt substantively with the years of Muhammad Riza Shah’s power, and concluded with an assessment of the impact of its history on the structure of the Iranian army in the Islamic republic, its military effectiveness, and its political reliability. The project incorporated a strong comparative element and a discussion of the lessons of the Iranian experience for understanding and predicting the behavior both of the Iranian and of other Middle Eastern armies.

The case study aimed at drawing lessons from the Iranian experience regarding issues such as: under what circumstances armies decide to resort to force to influence the political arena; the impact of western military assistance; the nature and consequences of programs of weapons acquisition and the prospects for arms control; and the role played by military force, actual and potential, in regional relations.

It seems, firstly, that political tendencies within the Iranian army were always more variegated than has been assumed; that communist or Tudah party affiliations among individual officers or groups of officers were mainly significant as an expression of radical nationalism; and that elements comparable to the "Free Officers" of the Arab world may be identified in the late 1940s and '50s.

The research fell into three chronological periods: 1941–53, 1954–79, and post-1979. The first chronological period focused on the army as a factor in domestic Iranian politics and examined the interaction between army, shah and political opposition, beginning with an examination of the response of the officer corps to the deposition of its chief, Riza Shah, and the political impact on the army of the Allied invasion of 1941. The second chronological period of this research focused on the twin processes of the consolidation of Muhammad Riza Shah’s control over the army and the consolidation of his army-based regime’s control over the country. The third period examined the role played by the professional army under the Islamic Republic. The research has posited a number of conclusions, of which the most important may be summarized as follows. It seems, firstly, that political tendencies within the Iranian army were always more variegated than has been assumed; that communist or Tudah party affiliations among individual officers or groups of officers were mainly significant as an expression of radical nationalism; and that elements comparable to the “Free Officers” of the Arab world may be identified in the late 1940s and ’50s. Clearly, between 1941 and 1954, the most senior reaches of the officer corps contained individuals and groups possessing political ambitions that were independent of the shah, though not politically radical, and that the stifling of such tendencies as the shah consolidated his power was partially responsible for the army’s paralysis in 1977–9. Indeed, the measures employed by the shah to protect himself from any emerging military ambition resulted in the army’s political paralysis in 1977–9, and in its failure to generate an alternative leadership capable of replacing the shah but preserving secular nationalist rule in Iran, an idiom to which it had historically been wedded.

The research also argues that the army’s competence and effectiveness in its conventional military capacity was, and remained, problematic, and that, although Iran claimed a regional role based on military strength, this strength was largely illusory, as was demonstrated for example by the counter-insurgency operations in Dhofar in the 1970s. Furthermore it seems that considerable confusion resulted from a shift away from the army’s traditional role, of safeguarding internal security, towards regional concerns, while the regime yet continued to rely on the army to suppress domestic opposition, a task for which it was no longer being trained or equipped. The research has found that the army was a crucial vehicle for the replacement of British influence in Iran by US influence and that the shah was the most suitable candidate for facilitating the increasing US domination of the army, senior military officers themselves often wishing to distance the army from the US military missions and retain control more securely in their own hands. The “Americanization” of the army was, furthermore, one of the most important factors tarnishing the army’s nationalist credentials and ultimately discrediting the regime itself. The research has concluded that a professional army has survived the vicissitudes of revolution and war in Iran but that it has played and will continue to play a subordinate political role in the Islamic republic, and that mechanisms are in place to protect the regime from any military challenge.

Bibliography

1. Cronin, Stephanie (eds.)."Riza Shah and the Paradoxes of Military Modernizarion in Iran." The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921-1941. New York: Routledgecurzon, 2003.

2. Cronin, Stephanie "Riza Shah and the Paradoxes of Military Modernizarion in Iran." Oriente Moderno. forthcoming.

The Dynamics of Violence in Civil War: Evaluating the Impact of Ethnicity on Violence

Stathis Kalyvas, Political Science, New York University

Research Grant, 2000, 2001

---

My goal in this project was to investigate the assumption that ethnic conflict is associated with higher levels of violence compared to other forms of conflict, such as revolutionary wars. More specifically, I sought to evaluate whether and how ethnic violence in the context of a civil war is really different from nonethnic violence and estimate to what extent ethnic violence is really ethnic; for, ethnic violence is more than violence between individuals of different ethnicities.

The main obstacle in answering this question is methodological: comparing ethnic and nonethnic wars does not allow us to control for the multitude of factors that may be causing whatever differences we observe. In addition, it would be difficult to move from correlations to causal connections.

As a result, I chose to begin with a carefully designed paired comparison at the micro level, as a first step toward a broader investigation to be undertaken in the future. Having completed a microcomporative study of violence in about seventy villages of Southern Greece (the Argolid region) where the civil war took place within a homogeneous ethnic environment, I used the support of the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation to conduct a study of a region in Northern Greece that was similar in many respects to the southern one, but was ethnically diverse and polarized (the Almopia region). Fieldwork involving interviews and archival research was conducted in 2000 and 2001.

Insofar as I was able to isolate an independent effect of ethnicity on violence, I found that the two were inversely related: the presence of the ethnic cleavage tended to reduce the levels of violence, by acting as a deterrent under conditions of contested control.

The goal was to find out which of the following three outcomes were supported by the data: ethnic polarization causes (a) higher levels of violence, (b) lower levels of violence, or (c) has no effect. The results support strongly the third hypothesis, while also suggesting some support for the second one. The first hypothesis was rejected. It is important to emphasize here that these findings cannot be generalized to the universe of conflict, but constitute a first step toward more rigorous empirical and theoretical work.

More specifically, I found that violence was considerably less widespread in the ethnically heterogeneous northern region than in the ethnically homogeneous southern one. This cannot be accounted for by patterns of group interaction: ethnic isolation and animosity were real; however, they did not lead to mass violence. In fact, the ethnic cleavage appears to have had little independent effect on the dynamics of violence during the civil war. Factors related to the conduct of warfare (the resources of the rival sides, the level of militarization of the conflict, and the incumbents’ ability to move the population away from mountainous terrain and close to well-defended urban centers) appear to account for the relative absence of lethal violence. Insofar as I was able to isolate an independent effect of ethnicity on violence, I found that the two were inversely related: the presence of the ethnic cleavage tended to reduce the levels of violence, by acting as a deterrent under conditions of contested control.

My research suggests that the observed or perceived relation between ethnic polarization and violence may be the result of a selection bias; as we continue to study ethnic violence, we should take much more seriously into account overlooked factors such as the type of warfare and the resources of the combatants in addition to the nature of the social and political divisions, of which ethnicity is only one.

Competitive and Cooperative Behaviors among Forest Elephants in the Presence of a Limited Resource

Katy Payne, Bioacoustics, Cornell University

Research Grant, 2001, 2002

---

In early 2002, ELP (the Elephant Listening Project) collected data on the behavior of forest elephants in the Central African Republic’s Dzanga National Park. The field site is a large, mineral-rich clearing in the equatorial rainforest; it is a unique center of forest elephant concentration and also the site of much competition. This fact in combination with team member Andrea Turkalo’s ability to recognize roughly 80 percent of the estimated three thousand elephants individually (the result of her twelve-year research project here), made Dzanga an ideal place for a detailed study of dominance and aggression in elephants.

ELP conducted focal surveys to measure the incidence and intensity of aggressive interactions among elephants in a particular (“focal”) area of the clearing that contained preferred drinking pits and was thus the site of easily defined competition. In twenty-three focal surveys, 553 aggressive interactions were documented. The same events were recorded acoustically on seven autonomous recording units surrounding the clearing. These are small, self-contained recorders capable of storing months of audio, and are time-synchronized via GPS signals. From this composite recording, elephant calls were later located on a computer-generated map. Simultaneous video recordings enabled us to attribute many located calls to the elephants who made them. This includes infrasonic calls, those calls made below the range of human hearing.

Most of the relationships revealed support the hypothesis that elephants use aggression to establish and/or maintain their place in a dominance hierarchy which can be roughly defined in terms of age/sex classes, as follows: musth males>adult males>subadult males>adult and subadult females>juveniles>infants and newborn calves. Aggressors tend to target individuals in the same or lower rank than themselves. This finding holds true both in cases of active aggression and in displacements. The latter are situations where there is no contact and no visible threat on the part of the displacer. This strongly suggests that elephants are aware of their relative status in a preestablished hierarchy, and that this awareness persists in the absence of aggression.

Overall, we found a positive correlation between the frequency of aggressive acts and the numbers of elephants in the clearing. This suggests a relationship between aggression and resource limitation and/or crowding and/or the contagion of social excitement.

The 553 aggressive acts documented in twenty-three focal surveys varied in intensity and nature. Overall, we found a positive correlation between the frequency of aggressive acts and the numbers of elephants in the clearing. This suggests a relationship between aggression and resource limitation and/or crowding and/or the contagion of social excitement.

The negative correlation between the number of displacements per survey and the ratio of adult and subadult males to other elephants in the clearing suggests that members of these dominant age/sex classes can suppress aggressive interactions by members of other less dominant age/sex classes. The presence of older males seems to provide a stabilizing force.

High-frequency calls (screams and trumpets) were correlated with aggression, all trumpets being made by aggressors and most screams by objects of aggression. Most of the screams were associated with tactile active behaviors (stabs, kicks, jousting, and shoves) and nontactile active interactions (chasing, trunk-shooing and defense of hole). It seems that high-frequency vocal responses can indicate not only the presence but also the intensity of aggressive acts.

None of the contact interactions resulted in obvious serious injuries. It is clear that dominance is quite different in nature from active aggression and violence, at times serving to abort or mediate potentially injurious interactions. In the above analyses we included a set of mildly aggressive interactions labeled as displacement. Without physical contact, these interactions appeared to reinforce elephants’ awareness of a dominance hierarchy. We postulate for forest elephants that although the cost of maintaining a rigorous dominance hierarchy includes such mildly aggressive interactions, their presence effectively precludes greater losses to the individual, family, and society.

Political Violence, Military Conflict and Civil Unrest in Palestine: The Palestinian Police, the Fatah Tanzim and the “Al-Aqsa Intifada”

Nur Masalha, Political History of the Middle East, Saint Mary's University of Surrey

Research Grant, 2002, 2003

---

This research project was originally undertaken with the aim of examining the roles played by the military and civilian police forces of the Palestinian Authority, and the popular militias (in particular the Fatah Tanzim), during the current uprising (“Al-Aqsa Intifada”) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was particularly intended to focus on the likely future trajectories of these organizations, the factors determining the dynamics between them, and the various options for their future evolution. The project outlined a number of research objectives relating both to the Palestinian police and to the popular militias and raised a number of hypotheses about the relationship between these forces; between these forces and the Palestinian Authority; and between these forces and the local population.

The research began by examining the pre–Al-Aqsa Intifada period, focusing on the post-1993 state formation in Palestine and the roles played by the Palestinian Police and Security Forces in the pre-Intifada period between 1994 and September 2000. The work then proceeded to examine the causes for outbreak and subsequent militarization of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the rise of the Fatah Tanzim, and the emergence of the Palestinian popular militias in 2001 and 2002.

During the course of the research, the situation in Palestine changed dramatically. Throughout 2002 and 2003, the project continued to monitor ongoing developments on the ground as they affected the research, and to modify the goals accordingly. Despite the deteriorating security situation in Palestine, which made visits to many parts of the country difficult, field trips to Jerusalem, Ramallah. and Bethlehem were extremely useful in conducting interviews and collecting primary and secondary material in Arabic and Hebrew.

The police as an institution engaged in very little armed resistance. Most of the resistance put up by the Palestinian population was led by the militias (Fatah Tanzim, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad).

Of particular importance was the strategy demonstrated by the Israeli government under Ariel Sharon, of semipermanent military reoccupation of the West Bank, which seemed to be aimed at the very destruction of the Palestinian Authority itself. The research attempted to measure and assess the effect of the ongoing reoccupation on the ability to respond of the Palestinian security forces and the militias, and concluded that the Israeli assault on the official Palestine Police (the destruction of police stations and police facilities throughout the occupied territories), contributed to the rise of the popular militias and armed units, including those of the Fatah Tanzim, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade and militant Islamic organizations (including Hamas and Islamic Jihad).

During its reoccupation of the West Bank, the Israeli army targeted the security organizations of the Palestinian Authority, particularly the police, and police posts and police stations were repeatedly destroyed and the police killed or arrested in very large numbers. The police as an institution engaged in very little armed resistance. Most of the resistance put up by the Palestinian population was led by the militias (Fatah Tanzim, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad).

The decreasing ability of the Palestinian Authority to function, on the security or any other level, resulted from the Sharon government’s underlying strategy of preventing the emergence of a viable Palestinian state. This in turn led to the development of a degree of skepticism among the Palestinian population about the Palestinian Authority’s future and the future of the two-state solution in general.

Among the specific new factors which the research identified as key are the following:

a) the tendency of the popular Palestinian militias to look to the example of the Lebanese Hizbullah and its tactics in confronting the Israeli army in south Lebanon;
b) the rise in levels of support for the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade among the population;
c) the close collaboration and a certain degree of merging between Islamist and nationalist forces and between these groups and the official police;
d) the occasional adoption by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, which had a secular nationalist tendency, of the tactic of suicide attacks which had hitherto been confined to Islamic groups;
e) evidence of an increasing traumatization of Palestinian society (see points d and f.);
f) the participation of Palestinian women in armed attacks in both secular nationalist and Islamist armed groups, including in suicide attacks;
g) the serious implications of the Brigade’s activities in terms of undermining the Palestinian Authority.

Neuroendocrine Consequences of Dominance and Subordination

Randall R. Sakai, Biology, University of Pennsylvania

Research Grant, 1997

---

The visible burrow system (VBS) provides a unique model for studying complex behaviors in rat social groups in a seminaturalistic environment. In this setting, dominance is associated with the expression of species-typical aggressive behaviors. The studies in our proposal allowed us to explore the basis of these behaviors at levels not feasible or ethically permissible in human subjects. Specifically, we have assessed multiple behavioral, physiological, chemical, and neurological parameters in rats before, during and after they live in the VBS and experience hierarchy formation. Our studies are designed to discover specific neurochemical and hormonal signaling pathways linked to both dominant and subordinate behaviors. Once these correlates are identified, it is our long-term goal to then develop and use experimental interventions in an attempt to modify offensive/aggressive behaviors of dominants and defensive behaviors of dominant and subordinates. In addition to novel insights into the biochemical basis of aggressive behavior, these studies should provide us with a wealth of new and important information on the physiological consequences of prolonged exposure to subordination, a stressor that is of particular relevance to humans. Because this kind of psychological stress has been associated with an increased incidence of both mental and somatic illnesses, a greater understanding of the neurochemical and endocrine correlates and consequences of stress should lead to more effective therapeutic approaches to stress-related disorders.

Using a visible burrow system to investigate social interactions, we have found that subordinate status is positively correlated with plasma stress hormone levels but negatively correlated with plasma androgen levels.

Our recent studies using the VBS have documented behaviors in the subordinate rats that include reduced social, sexual and aggressive activity, changes in sleep cycles, and weight loss associated with lower food intake. This spectrum of behaviors is characteristic of human symptoms of chronic subordination, loss of job and job security, and clinical depression. This experimental preparation therefore provides an important and unique animal model for the analysis of the behavioral, neuroendocrine, and neurochemical changes that accompany the process of becoming subordinate as well as those involved with the development of dominance.

Using a visible burrow system to investigate social interactions, we have found that subordinate status is positively correlated with plasma stress hormone levels but negatively correlated with plasma androgen levels. We have also determined that a significant subset of subordinate animals become nonresponsive to novel stressors. These findings are consonant with what has been reported for humans living under conditions of chronic stress situations. We have therefore begun to investigate possible neural correlates of the subordinate state, and have recently found that animals living in the visible burrow system have changes in neuron morphology. These data are important for several reasons. First, altered neuron morphology is indicative of chronically altered neuronal activity and connectivity. Second, the brain region in which we have found these changes, the hippocampus, is known to be involved in responding to and learning about emotional situations. Finally, the data are consistent with what has been reported using different models of experimental stress. Of primary interest to us is that when the data were analyzed by social status, the dominant animals were observed to have the greatest degree of neuronal remodeling, with the subordinate animals having significantly less. This key finding suggests that the reports of neuronal restructuring that have been observed in other experimental models may in fact reflect different underlying endocrine and neurochemical mechanisms. It further suggests that a more sophisticated animal model, such as the visible burrow system, will be necessary for uncovering and ultimately understanding the complex changes that occur in the brain when individuals are stressed in naturalistic ways. At this point, it is unclear if the changes observed are harmful to the animal in and of themselves, especially since it is the dominant animals that display the greatest neuronal change. Our studies continue to build upon our previous research by determining whether these social stress–induced changes in the brain are reversible or not, and whether changes in neurogenesis or neurodegeneration may produce pathological situations to these animals.

Hardships and Violence against Street Children in Sub-Saharan African Cities: Understanding Street Children and Street Life in Urban Tanzania

Joe L. P. Lugalla, Anthropology, University of New Hampshire

Research Grant, 1999, 2000

---

One of the most recent social problems dominant in cities in sub-Saharan Africa is the rapid increase in the number of unsupervised children living or working on the streets. Most of these children, for various reasons, have either abandoned or have been abandoned by their families and have migrated to urban areas in order to earn a living. Their rapid increase, how they survive and grow up as young adults, the hardships they experience, and the types of violence they endure, raise concern and calls for immediate attention. Our study set out to examine the dynamics of street children’s lives in Dar-es-Salaam. The aim was to advance knowledge and understanding of the situation of poor children who live independently on the streets of sub-Saharan African cities by addressing the questions posed above. We explored the factors that push children onto the streets and examined the nature of their street life and how they cope with the situation. We also examined the hardships and violence they endure and how this affects their health.

Contrary to the conventional belief that street children are young criminals in the making, our study found out that most of these children are pushed onto streets by societal factors beyond their control.

The findings of this study suggest that rural poverty, abuse, and the scourge of HIV/AIDS act simultaneously in manufacturing a great number of helpless children who resort to street life. While on the streets, street children experience a rough life associated with the lack of basic necessities of life like shelter, food, health, education, and others. Both adult urban residents and law enforcement institutions regard them as criminals and most of them experience general violence and, for girls, sexual violence tends to be the routine of life. The study argues that street life has tremendous negative consequences on children’s health. Contrary to the conventional belief that street children are young criminals in the making, our study found out that most of these children are pushed onto streets by societal factors beyond their control. Street children are the neediest children in urban Africa and also the least assisted. The study concludes by detailing down-to-earth short- and long-term interventions that focus on addressing rampant rural poverty and controlling HIV/AIDS. We also recommend the formulation of policies that seek to improve the welfare of vulnerable social groups like women, street children, and children who have been orphaned by AIDS or other factors.

Bibliography

1. Lugalla, Joe L.P. and Colleta G. Kibassa. Urban Life and Street Children's Health: Children's Accounts of Urban Hardships and Violence in Tanzania. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2003.

Striving in the Path of God: Discursive Traditions on Jihad and the Cult of Martyrdom

Asma Afsaruddin, Classics, Notre Dame University

Research Grant, 2001

---

My research project is focused primarily on a specific genre in Arabic-Islamic literature known as fasda’il al-jihad (“excellences or merits of striving/struggling [in the path of God]”). The prophetic and other kinds of reports contained in this literature will be adduced as evidence in favor of the thesis that the understanding of jihad in the Islamic tradition as primarily “armed struggle/combat” is a late one, which developed out of an earlier matrix of multiple and competing meanings of the term. Furthermore, the cult of martyrdom it engendered developed in response to specific historical and political circumstances. Among these circumstances are the continuing border skirmishes with the Byzantines in the Umayyad period (661–750), the Crusades and the Mongol attacks from the 11th century on, all hostile encounters which prompted the rise of this hortatory literature to galvanize a perhaps-reluctant populace to stave off external threats to Islam.

The Qur'an, the earliest document in Islam, alludes to a multiplicity of meanings for the locution "al-jihad fi sabil Allah," (lit. "striving/struggling in the path of/for the sake of God").

The reasons for propounding the relatively late and historically conditioned development of the notion of jihad as primarily armed combat that creates martyrs for the faith are compelling. Most importantly, the Qur’an, the earliest document in Islam, alludes to a multiplicity of meanings for the locution “al-jihad fi sabil Allah,” (lit. “striving/struggling in the path of/for the sake of God”). Furthermore, the Qur’an has no term for a martyr nor a well-developed concept of martyrdom, which is a necessary corollary to the notion of jihad as religious military activity. The term shahid that is understood today to refer to a martyr occurs only in the hadith literature; in the Qur’an it refers exclusively to a legal or eye witness. Proceeding from this thesis, my study will go on to contextualize the evolution and invocation of this hortatory discourse; that is, to explore why and when this literature was produced, what were the external and internal influences shaping the contours of this discourse, and what bearing does that have on tracing the complex semantic and ideological history of the term and functions of jihad. Considerable attention will be paid to sources such as the related “excellences of patience” (fada’il al-sabr) literature, which documents “alternate” views of jihad as quietism that emphasizes cultivation of the trait of patient forbearance in the face of trials. This approach promises to considerably nuance and transform our current state of knowledge concerning early and competitive perspectives on jihad.

The Carjacker’s Perspective: A Qualitative Study of Urban Violence

Richard Wright, Criminology, University of Missouri-St. Louis

Research Grant, 2000

---

With the exception of homicide, perhaps no offense is more symbolic of contemporary urban violence than carjacking. Carjacking, the taking of a motor vehicle by force or threat of force, has attained almost mythical status in the annals of urban violence and has played a substantial role in fueling the fear of crime that keeps people off of their own streets. But for all of the media attention carjacking has received in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, it remains a poorly understood and underresearched crime. In an attempt to rectify this situation, we conducted a field-based study of the decision-making of active carjackers in real-life settings and circumstances, focusing on, among other things, the subjective foreground conditions that move such offenders from an unmotivated state to one in which they are determined to attack a specific vehicle and/or driver. Drawing from semistructured ethnographic interviews with twenty-eight active carjackers recruited from the streets of St. Louis, Missouri, we found that while the decision to commit any given carjacking stems most directly from a situated interaction between particular sorts of perceived opportunities and particular sorts of perceived needs and desires, this decision is activated, mediated, and shaped by ongoing participation in urban street culture.

We found that while the decision to commit any given carjacking stems most directly from a situated interaction between particular sorts of perceived opportunities and particular sorts of perceived needs and desires, this decision is activated, mediated, and shaped by ongoing participation in urban street culture.

Bibliography

1. Jacobs, B., Topalli, V. and Wright, R. (in press) "Carjacking, Streetlife, and Offender Motivation," British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 43, No. 4.

2. Topalli, V. and Wright, R. (in press) Dubs and Dees, Beats and Rims. In Dabney, D., Criminal Behavior: A Text Reader, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Provisional Irish Republicans: Ten Years On

Robert W. White, Sociology, Indiana University

Research Grant, 1996, 1997

---

The primary finding from my research is that, among Irish Republicans, there is a group of people who, no matter what, will not stop their involvement in political violence until they achieve the political goal they seek. That is, until, in their minds, they have achieved a declaration of intent from the British government to withdraw from Northern Ireland.

Most of the people who live in Ireland view themselves as “Irish” people. Traditionally, they tend to be Catholic. A significant number of people who live in Ireland, however, view themselves as British in origin. These are the descendants of settlers who “planted” Ireland in the seventeenth century, and they tend to be Protestant in their religion. The conflict in Ireland is not about religion, but rather ethnic identity. From the beginning of the English conquest of Ireland, in the twelfth century, there has been conflict between “natives” and “invaders.” When Ireland was partitioned in 1920, the partition was implemented such that a majority of those living in the Irish Free State (now the Republic) were Catholic and a majority of those living in Northern Ireland were Protestant. This compounded the perspective that the conflict is over religion. Successive British governments have supported this interpretation, which also supports their interpretation that the British Army in Northern Ireland is a neutral peacekeeping force.

The primary finding from my research is that, among Irish Republicans, there is a group of people who, no matter what, will not stop their involvement in political violence until they achieve the political goal they seek.

From the 1920s, when the Irish Republican Army forced the British to withdraw from that area of Ireland where most people viewed themselves as Irish, there has been either open or soon-to-be open conflict between those who seek a full British withdrawal from Ireland and those who do not. This includes IRA campaigns from 1939 to 1945, 1956 to 1962, the Provisional IRA campaign from 1969 to 1994 and 1996 to 1997, and the current paramilitary campaign by the Continuity IRA (there have also been splinter groups that engaged in Irish Republican political violence, e.g., the Irish National Liberation Army). The primary target of these campaigns has been the security forces in Northern Ireland, including the British Army and local police forces. A large number of civilians have also been killed, by Republican paramilitaries, Protestant paramilitaries, and the security forces.

A key feature of all these Irish Republican organizations is that among their founders, especially with respect to the Provisional IRA and the Continuity IRA (which were founded by the same people), are individuals who are the children of a previous generation of IRA fighters. How these people were raised, who these people are, greatly influences their perspective. Many of them have suffered significant personal costs, either through their parents, themselves, or their children, in pursuit of the “Irish Republic.” To ask them to quit, to accept that the British will always remain in Ireland, is to ask them to not be who they are, their raison d’être. Further, the socialization that produced these people also provided them with an interpretation of Irish history that offers a wealth of evidence that their perspective—that the British will not leave Ireland unless they are forced to so do—is correct. The people described are politically sophisticated; they are not alienated, lost souls or people driven by spite or hatred. This makes them that much more difficult to deal with, from the perspective of a government.

Further, it would appear that people who, no matter what, will not give up the gun until their objective is achieved are present in many politically violent social movements, including the PLO, the ANC, and ETA. Such people keep the “dream” alive across generations.

Bibliography

1. Stryker, S., Owens, T. J., & White, R. W. (2000). Self, Identity, and Social Movements. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Economies of Violence: Petroleum, Politics and Community in the Niger Delta, Nigeria

Michael Watts, International Studies, University of California, Berkeley

Research Grant, 2002

---

Petroleum in Nigeria has produced a combustible politics marked by violence. Rather than see oil-dependency as a source of predation or as a source of state military power, this research shows how oil capitalism produces particular sorts of enclave economies and particular sorts of governable spaces characterized by violence and instability. While the biophysical qualities of oil matter in this analysis, so do the powers of transnational oil companies, the character of “the oil complex,” and the ways in which oil as a territorially based and nationalized commodity can become the basis for making claims. Petrocapitalism operates through a particular sort of “oil” (a configuration of oil firms, the state, and oil-producing communities). The complex is strongly territorial, operating through local oil concessions. The presence and activities of the oil companies as part of the oil complex constitute a challenge to forms of community authority, interethnic relations, and local state institutions principally through the property and land disputes that are engendered, and through forms of popular mobilization and agitation to gain access to company rents and compensation revenues, and the oil revenues of the Nigerian state, largely through the creation of regional and/or local state institutions. The oil complex generates differing sorts of “governable spaces” in which contrasting identities and forms of rule come into play. In some cases youth and intergenerational forces are key; in some cases gender, in others the clan or the kingdom or the ethnic minority (or indigenous peoples), in some cases local chiefly or governmental authorities, and the forces of the local state. A striking aspect of contemporary development in Nigeria is the simultaneous production of differing forms of rule and governable space—different politics of scale—all products of similar forces and yet which work against, and often stand in direct contradiction to one another.

This research shows how oil capitalism produces particular sorts of enclave economies and particular sorts of governable spaces characterized by violence and instability.

This project focuses on three spaces: on chieftainship, the indigene or ethnic minority, and the nation. These social idioms are inseparable from oil, but their forms of identification and the robustness of their spaces are often incompatible. Standing at the center of each governable space is a contradiction: at the level of the oil-producing chieftainship, the overthrowing of gerontocratic authority and its substitution by a sort of violent mafia constituted by militant youth. At the level of the ethnic community is the tension between civic nationalism and a sort of exclusivist militant particularism (a sort of aggressive ethnonationalism). And at the level of the nation, one sees the contradiction between oil-based state centralization and state fragmentation, as oil becomes a sort of generalized equivalent put to the service of massive corruption. It is in this sense that the research invokes the idea of “economies of violence” to characterize rule (stable and unstable) in contemporary Nigeria. This project traces the varieties of violence engendered by oil, to elaborate the ways in which resources, territoriality and identity can constitute forms of rule, and understand the genesis of economies of violence that emerge from differing sorts of governable (or ungovernable) spaces.