Role of Estrogen Receptors in Aggressive Behaviors

Sonoko Ogawa, Neuroscience, Rockefeller University

Research Grant, 1996, 1997

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Our research focus has been in the understanding of differential regulation of aggressive behavior by two types of estrogen receptors, ER-α and ER-β. ERs, as a member of the nuclear receptor superfamily, are involved in transcriptional regulation of various gene products. It has been known for some time that testosterone is a major factor to facilitate aggressive behavior in most species, including humans. Since testosterone not only acts on brain androgen receptors in its original form but can also be aromatized to estradiol in the brain, it has been hypothesized that estrogen receptor (classical ER-α) mediated action of gonadal steroid hormones may also be involved in the regulation of aggressive behavior. The recent discovery of a second form of estrogen receptor, ER-β, however, further complicated the role played by nuclear steroid receptors in the regulation of aggressive behavior. Using mice that lack either ER-α or ER-β genes, we found that two types of ER may have an opposite effect on aggressive behavior. Specifically, mice lacking ER-α genes were not aggressive at all, whereas those lacking ER-β genes were more aggressive than control littermate mice, particularly during puberty and young adult ages. These findings suggest that activation of ER-α is necessary for the induction of aggressive behavior, whereas activation of ER-β may inhibit aggressive behavior in male mice. It is assumed that ER-α activation at the perinatal critical period for sexual differentiation of brain development is essential for expression of male-typical aggressive behavior. On the other hand, ER-β‘s role is more of a modulatory one to fine-tune the final outcome of the behavior by affecting animals’ anxiety levels as well as social memory/learning ability. Our recent studies suggest that ER-β may inhibit aggression by modifying the synthesis and secretion of neuropeptides, oxytocin, and vasopressin, as well as a neurotransmitter, serotonin.

Mice lacking ER-α genes were not aggressive at all, whereas those lacking ER-β genes were more aggressive than control littermate mice, particularly during puberty and young adult ages.

Bibliography

1. Ogawa et al., PNAS, 94, 1476-1481, 1997.

2. Ogawa et al., PNAS, 96, 12887-12892, 1999.

3. Ogawa et al., PNAS, 97, 14737-14741, 2000.

4. Ogawa et al., Current Opinions of Endocrinology and Diabetes, 9, 224-229.

5. Nomura et al., Hormones and Behavior, 41, 288-296, 2002.

The Association of Polymorphisms in Genes affecting Monoamine Neurotransmission with Aggressive Behavior in Schizophrenic Violent Individuals

Rael Strous, Psychiatry, Beer Yaakov Mental Health Center

Research Grant, 2000, 2001

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Violence remains an important sociobiological problem, and is reported to affect approximately 3.7% of the population each year. In the mentally ill, the prevalence of violent behavior is higher that in the general population. The etiology of violence in the general population, as well as in the mentally ill, is poorly understood, but there are very likely common biological and genetic factors that play a role. This international collaborative study intended to focus on the genetic aspects of violence, investigating polymorphic differences in genes that influence catecholaminergic neurotransmitter systems in the brain.

Considering the wealth of research demonstrating an association between these monoamine neurotransmitter systems and aggression, polymorphic differences in the genes that affect monoamine transmission may play a role in human aggression. Our team has identified a common functional polymorphism at COMT codon 158. The COMT enzyme inactivates catecholamines by catalyzing S-adenosyl-L-methionine dependent methyl conjugation. This polymorphism results in substantial differences in enzyme activity. One allele encodes a methionine at codon 158 (158Met) and the other allele a valine (158Val). 158Val homozygotes have 3- to 4-fold higher levels of activity than 158Met homozygotes.

This investigation confirmed previous evidence by our group showing a relationship between a polymorphism in the gene encoding the enzyme catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) and aggression in schizophrenia.

The COMT polymorphism has since been investigated as a possible contributing factor in several psychiatric and behavioral conditions. This investigation confirmed previous evidence by our group showing a relationship between a polymorphism in the gene encoding the enzyme catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) and aggression in schizophrenia. Patients with schizophrenia (SZ) were assessed for violent behavior using the Lifetime History of Aggression (LHA) scale, an 11-item questionnaire that includes Aggression, Self-Directed Aggression, and Consequences/Antisocial Behavior subscales. DNA was genotyped for the COMT 158 polymorphism, as well as a functional polymorphism in the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene promoter. Similar to our previously reported findings, a statistically significant association was found between aggressive behavior in SZ and the COMT 158 polymorphism; mean LHA scores were higher in subjects homozygous for 158Met, the low enzyme activity COMT variant (F(2,105) = 5.616, P = 0.005). Analysis of the major LHA subscales revealed that the association with 158Met was due to high scores on the Aggression and Self-Directed Aggression subscales, but not the Consequences/Antisocial Behavior subscale. No significant association was detected for the MAOA gene alone.

Our findings provide further support that COMT is a modifying gene that plays a role in determining interindividual variability in the proclivity for outward and self-directed aggressive behavior found in some schizophrenic patients. Considering the role of dopamine in schizophrenia and the finding that dopamine agonists provoke aggressive behavior, an increase in dopaminergic transmission caused by COMT 158Met is a possible mechanism through which this allele can act. In the context of preexisting prefrontal abnormalities in schizophrenia caused by genetic, developmental and/or environmental factors, 158Met homozygosity may lead to an increase in prefrontal dopamine with an increased propensity for impulsive, violent behavior in schizophrenia.

Bibliography

1. Rael, Strous. Aggressive behavior in schizophrenia is associated with the low enzyme activity COMT polymorphism: A replication study. Am J Med Genet. 2003;120B:29-34). (July 2003) American Journal of Medical Genetics (Strous RD, Nolan KA, Lapidus R, Diaz L, Saito T, Lachman HM).

Provisional Irish Republicans: Ten Years On

Robert W. White, Sociology, Indiana University

Research Grant, 1996, 1997

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The primary finding from my research is that, among Irish Republicans, there is a group of people who, no matter what, will not stop their involvement in political violence until they achieve the political goal they seek. That is, until, in their minds, they have achieved a declaration of intent from the British government to withdraw from Northern Ireland.

Most of the people who live in Ireland view themselves as “Irish” people. Traditionally, they tend to be Catholic. A significant number of people who live in Ireland, however, view themselves as British in origin. These are the descendants of settlers who “planted” Ireland in the seventeenth century, and they tend to be Protestant in their religion. The conflict in Ireland is not about religion, but rather ethnic identity. From the beginning of the English conquest of Ireland, in the twelfth century, there has been conflict between “natives” and “invaders.” When Ireland was partitioned in 1920, the partition was implemented such that a majority of those living in the Irish Free State (now the Republic) were Catholic and a majority of those living in Northern Ireland were Protestant. This compounded the perspective that the conflict is over religion. Successive British governments have supported this interpretation, which also supports their interpretation that the British Army in Northern Ireland is a neutral peacekeeping force.

The primary finding from my research is that, among Irish Republicans, there is a group of people who, no matter what, will not stop their involvement in political violence until they achieve the political goal they seek.

From the 1920s, when the Irish Republican Army forced the British to withdraw from that area of Ireland where most people viewed themselves as Irish, there has been either open or soon-to-be open conflict between those who seek a full British withdrawal from Ireland and those who do not. This includes IRA campaigns from 1939 to 1945, 1956 to 1962, the Provisional IRA campaign from 1969 to 1994 and 1996 to 1997, and the current paramilitary campaign by the Continuity IRA (there have also been splinter groups that engaged in Irish Republican political violence, e.g., the Irish National Liberation Army). The primary target of these campaigns has been the security forces in Northern Ireland, including the British Army and local police forces. A large number of civilians have also been killed, by Republican paramilitaries, Protestant paramilitaries, and the security forces.

A key feature of all these Irish Republican organizations is that among their founders, especially with respect to the Provisional IRA and the Continuity IRA (which were founded by the same people), are individuals who are the children of a previous generation of IRA fighters. How these people were raised, who these people are, greatly influences their perspective. Many of them have suffered significant personal costs, either through their parents, themselves, or their children, in pursuit of the “Irish Republic.” To ask them to quit, to accept that the British will always remain in Ireland, is to ask them to not be who they are, their raison d’être. Further, the socialization that produced these people also provided them with an interpretation of Irish history that offers a wealth of evidence that their perspective—that the British will not leave Ireland unless they are forced to so do—is correct. The people described are politically sophisticated; they are not alienated, lost souls or people driven by spite or hatred. This makes them that much more difficult to deal with, from the perspective of a government.

Further, it would appear that people who, no matter what, will not give up the gun until their objective is achieved are present in many politically violent social movements, including the PLO, the ANC, and ETA. Such people keep the “dream” alive across generations.

Bibliography

1. Stryker, S., Owens, T. J., & White, R. W. (2000). Self, Identity, and Social Movements. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Hitler’s Prisons: Prisons and Penal Policies in Germany, 1900–1945

Nikolaus Wachsmann, History, University of Cambridge

Research Grant, 1999, 2002

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My research project explored the different manifestations and causes of aggression and violence in the carceral institutions of a totalitarian state, focusing on Nazi prisons. Widely overlooked by historians, these institutions played an indispensable part in the terror of the Third Reich, incarcerating many hundreds of thousands of men and women: common criminals, political opponents, “racial aliens,” and other social outsiders.

The HFG grant enabled me to examine discipline and punishment in Nazi prisons during the Second World War. This period saw a dramatic escalation of violence inside prisons. Local penal institutions were dominated by brutal forced labor, starvation rations, harsh disciplinary punishment, and physical violence, killing an estimated twenty thousand inmates. At the same time, the German prison authorities implemented large-scale extermination programs directed in particular at Jews, select Poles and political prisoners, and social outsiders labelled as asocial, disabled, or mentally ill. At the center stood the ”annihilation through labor” of some fourteen thousand prison inmates.

Much of my research has been concerned with explaining the involvement of legal officials in this violence. Unlike SS men controlling the concentration camps, many jurists were not fanatical Nazis and had already held state office before Hitler came to power. So why did these men (and a few women) become involved in violence and killings? Why did the existence of a long established, traditional legal system in Germany, and a professional body of trained jurists, provide no secure barrier against a descent into legal terror?

The thinking of officials was also shaped by their long-standing belief that certain offenders were "incorrigible." Crucially, this belief was a product not of Nazi ideology, but of modern criminology which insisted that objective scientific methods could determine the future social behavior of offenders.

It soon became clear that monocausal theories would not go far in answering these questions. Instead, the causes of violence turned out to be complex. Looking at the senior legal officials, racial prejudice against Jews and Poles—radicalized by Nazi policy during the war—played an important part. The thinking of officials was also shaped by their long-standing belief that certain offenders were “incorrigible.” Crucially, this belief was a product not of Nazi ideology, but of modern criminology which insisted that objective scientific methods could determine the future social behavior of offenders. But such doctrinaire views—no longer restrained in the Third Reich—were not all decisive. Senior legal officials were also driven by the opportunistic desire to satisfy Hitler, who held jurists in particularly low esteem.

Turning to local prison officials, their actions were influenced by the ideological factors already mentioned, given added weight in directives from above. Racial abuse was common, as was the maltreatment of supposedly “incorrigible” offenders. But more “practical” concerns were vital, too. To start with, economic considerations were crucial. Production for the war increasingly became the yardstick by which a governor’s performance was measured. As a result, local officials were determined to work the inmates harder than ever before, and to get rid—in one way or another—of those who obstructed the work process because of illness or old age. Local officials were also brutalized by the massive increase in the number of judicial death sentences, carried out inside prisons, and by the growing pressures of their jobs due to overcrowding and understaffing. More and more officials took out their frustrations on the prisoners.

The main focus of my research was on state violence. But I also uncovered examples of interprisoner conflict, fueled by the social and racial prejudices of individual inmates. Often, this resulted in collaboration with the prison authorities, for example by denouncing fellow prisoners. However, I found relatively little evidence for physical violence among the prisoners, so common in the contemporary prison. Overall, it seems that such violence was mostly limited to prison camps, where the authorities delegated important supervisory functions to inmates (just as they did in concentration camps). In regular prisons, by contrast, prisoners did not gain comparable power. It would seem as if the traditional military discipline still widely practiced here, centered around the strict supervision of inmates by warders, may have limited prisoner-on-prisoner violence. But more research is necessary here, to allow for firmer conclusions to be drawn. 

My research is published by Yale University Press as Hitler’s Prisons (New Haven, 2004). The findings presented in this book have already played an important part in the decision by the German government foundation “Memory, Responsibility and Future,” made in summer of 2003, to pay reparations to individual former inmates in Nazi prisons who had suffered under the poor conditions and forced labor.

Neuropharmacology of Female Aggression

Robert L. Meisel, Psychology, Purdue University

Research Grant, 1996

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Aggression is a normal component of the social behaviors of female mammals, including women. Despite the occurrence of aggression among females, relatively little research has focused on biological mechanisms regulating female aggression. To the contrary, most models of aggression in both animals and humans focus on a context in which males are aggressive, but females are not. This has lead to several critical errors in our understanding of aggression in females. The first error has been the perpetuation of the myth that there is a sex difference in aggression. This “sex difference” is more appropriately described in differences in the form in which aggression occurs and in the context in which individuals will express aggression. Following from this has been the focus on biological processes controlling aggression. Again, this has typically been a biology of male aggression. For example, we found that a member of a group of drugs called “serenics” (reducing aggression by making people serene) was very effective in reducing aggression in male hamsters, but was ineffective in altering aggression in female hamsters.

We determined that progesterone and related hormones do indeed act in the brain to inhibit aggression.

So what would regulate aggression in females? In rodents, it is clear that the release of hormones from the ovary (i.e., estrogen and progesterone) eliminates female aggression. In contrast, during the phases of the reproductive cycle when hormone levels are low, or following surgical removal of the ovaries, aggression is markedly elevated. We focused on the role of progesterone in the inhibition of aggression in female hamsters, because this hormone suggests possibilities for basic research that may lead to therapeutic treatments for anxiety and aggression in women. In recent years it has become clear that hormones like progesterone when produced in the brain act in a similar fashion to a class of minor tranquilizers, the benzodiazepines (e.g., valium). The goal of this research project was to examine conditions in which progesterone and related hormones would inhibit aggression using female hamsters as the model system. In fact, we determined that progesterone and related hormones do indeed act in the brain to inhibit aggression. The advantage of using these hormones as a basis for developing drug therapies for aggression and anxiety in females is that these naturally occurring substances could prove to be effective in women with fewer side effects than would traditional drug therapies.

Bibliography

1. Kohlert, J.G. and Meisel, R.L. Inhibition of aggression by progesterone and its metabolites in female Syrian hamsters. Aggressive Behavior, 27, 372-381, 2001.

Drugs, Violence, and National Honor: British Foreign Policy and the Opium Crisis, 1833–1840

Glenn Melancon, History, Southeastern Oklahoma State University

Research Grant, 1998

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The first Opium War (1840–1842) was a defining moment in Anglo-Chinese relations, and since the 1840s the histories of its origins have tended to be straightforward narratives suggesting that the British cabinet turned to its military to protect opium sales and to force open China trade. Whilst the monetary aspects of the war cannot be ignored, this book argues that economic interests should not overshadow another important aspect of British foreign policy—honor and shame.

British cabinet officials worried less about the danger to economic interests than the threat to their honor and the possible loss of power in Parliament.

Palmerston’s government recognized that failure to act with honor generated public outrage in the form of petitions to parliament and loss of votes, and as a result was at pains to take such considerations into account when making policy. Accordingly, British cabinet officials worried less about the danger to economic interests than the threat to their honor and the possible loss of power in Parliament. The decision to wage a drug war, however, made the government vulnerable to charges of immorality, creating the need to justify the war by claiming it was acting to protect British national honor.

Bibliography

1. Melancon, Glenn. Opium and Honour: The British Cabinet's Decision to Wage War on China, 1839-1840, International History Review, vol. 21.3 (December 1999): 855-874.

2. Melancon, Glenn, Peaceful Intentions: The First British Trade Commission in China, 1833-1835, Historical Research: The Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, vol. 73, no. 180 (February 2000): 33-47.

Intrahousehold Income Inequality and Conflict: Testing an Economic Model of Domestic Violence in Kerala, India

Kaivan Munshi, Economics, Brown University

Research Grant, 2002, 2003

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Domestic violence in developing countries has been an area of growing concern among researchers and activists in the women’s health and rights movements. An entrenched patriarchal system and a scarcity of labor market opportunities for women are seen to leave women at the mercy of their husbands. We would expect this situation to change over time with increased female participation in the labor market, but in fact the opposite pattern has been observed. Domestic violence and intrahousehold conflict have been observed to actually increase after the introduction of income-generation programs that are focused on women, for example, among Grameen Bank participants in Bangladesh. Our objective in this research project is to study the economic determinants of marital violence in South India and to make sense of the puzzling increase in intrahousehold conflict that accompanies a relative increase in female incomes. We use an interdisciplinary approach that combines the theory and methods of economics and sociology.

A major aim of our research is to estimate the causal effect of increases in female income on marital violence. To test for a causal relationship, researchers would ideally allow the male-female income differential to vary randomly across a group of households that are otherwise alike in every respect. Our study site consists of 23 estates of a tea plantation in Kerala, South India, and serves as an ideal setting for such a “natural experiment.” The 23 estates have enormous variation in rainfall and elevation, which in turn generates large differences in tea yields across the estates. Men and women are occupied in different tasks on the tea estate, so their earnings respond differently to the variation in tea yields. Exogenous climatic variation thus generates random variation in intrahousehold inequality across households. At the same time, one company owns all the estates. Structural similarities across estates, including identical access to health, education, and child care services, ensures a controlled environment. Using climatic conditions as a statistical instrument for male-female income differentials, we will be able to estimate the causal relationship between these differentials and marital violence. Our research improves on an enormous literature that has used variation in female-male income differentials, female education, and direct measures of women’s status without statistical instruments, to study the effect of female empowerment on household outcomes.

Using climatic conditions as a statistical instrument for male-female income differentials, we will be able to estimate the causal relationship between these differentials and marital violence.

This setting also affords us the opportunity to understand the process through which decision-making within the household changes as female incomes rise and the various forms that conflict may take. An additional component of our project includes an in-depth investigation of this process of social change using qualitative methodologies.

The subject of this research is extremely relevant at a time when income generation and empowerment efforts focused on women are being put into place throughout the developing world. We have spent many months in the field collecting a range of high-quality data sources, including tea company records and a survey of four thousand female workers between January and March 2003, which was funded by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. Preliminary results show that approximately 48 percent of female workers have ever been beaten by their husbands. Data entry of the survey will be completed in summer 2003, and data analysis is set to begin in fall 2003. The qualitative component of the project is scheduled for summer 2004.

Bibliography

1. Collins, Randall, Janet Saltzman Chafetz, Rae Lesser Blumberg, Scott Coltrane, and Jonathan H. Turner. 1993. Toward an integrated theory of gender stratification. Sociological perspectives 36(3):185-216.

2. Cooper, Russell and Andrew John. 1988. Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 103(3): 441-463.

3. Ellsberg, Mary, Lori Heise, Rodolfo Pena, Sonia Agurto, and Anna Winkvist. 2001. Researching domestic violence against women: Methodological and ethnical considerations. Studies in family planning 32(1):1-16.

4. Heise, Lori, Alanagh Raikes, Charlotte H. Watts, and Anthony B. Zwi. 1994. Violence against women: A neglected public health issue in less developed countries. Social science and medicine 39(9):1165-1179.

5. Jejeebhoy, Shireen J. 1998. Associations between wife-beating and fetal and infant death: Impressions from a survey in rural India. Studies in family planning 29(3):300-308.

6. Kabeer, Naila. 1997. Women, wages and intra-household power relations in urban Bangladesh. Development and change 28:261-302.

7. Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak. 1994. Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 84(2):132-136.

8. Mason 1997. Mason, Karen O. 1997. Gender and demographic change. In Jones, G. et al., eds. The continuing demographic transition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

9. McCloskey, Laura. 1996. Socioeconomic and coercive power within the family. Gender & society 10(4):449-463.

10. Rao, Vijayendra. 1997. Wife-beating in rural South India: A qualitative and econometric analysis. Social science and medicine 44(8):1169-1180.

11. Samarasinghe, Vidyamali. 1993. Puppets on a string: Women's wage work and empowerment among female tea plantation workers of Sri Lanka. The journal of developing areas 27:329-340.

12. Schuler, Sidney Ruth, Syed M. Hashemi, Ann P. Riley, and Shireen Akhter. 1996. Credit programs, patriarchy and men's violence against women in rural Bangladesh. Social science and medicine 43(12):1729-1742.

13. Whaley, Rachel Bridges. 2001. The paradoxical relationship between gender inequality and rape: Toward a refined theory. Gender & society 15(4):531-555.

Violent Territorialities and the Cultural Politics of Belonging in West Kalimantan Indonesia

Nancy Lee Peluso, Society and the Environment, University of California, Berkeley

Research Grant, 2002

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I am writing a book that explores the cultural and territorial politics of violence, identity, and landscape in the western districts of West Kalimantan, in Indonesian Borneo. I am looking specifically at how violence has been related to resource extraction, land control, and the construction of ethnic and national identities. Based on my own fieldwork and archival research since 1990, the book will document and analyze the forms, contexts, and representations of violence, and how violence has reshaped access to and control over the agrarian environment.

The violence cannot be separated from the specific historical and environmental conditions of the forested regions where the shaping and claiming of these agrarian landscapes have taken place.

I will also examine the parallel ways that two sets of peoples have imagined, experienced, and constructed these landscapes—Chinese and Salako peoples, who have moved through and settled in this region for three centuries. In reviewing archival materials, newly available secondary materials, and my own field notes and collected documents, I have found that the region cannot be described as only Dayak or Indonesian. Rather, the landscapes that have emerged from this study have been layered landscapes, and their visibility or invisibility has much to do with the politics of representation and history. Violence in different historical moments has shaped these patterns of layering and the capacity to actually “know” or to “see” the landscape in particular ways. Moreover, the violence cannot be separated from the specific historical and environmental conditions of the forested regions where the shaping and claiming of these agrarian landscapes have taken place. From customary Dayak lands and fruit forests to Chinese gold mines and rubber or pepper farms, to vast networks of irrigated rice fields, to production forestry zones, to watershed protection reserves, to military staging grounds, to sites of ethnic violence, various types of claims have emerged here through the politics of landscape. Past claims to territory are preserved not only within the practices and memories of people, but written on the landscape itself. I will discuss why political and communal violence have occurred in some historical moments and not others, and how violence has erased some claims from the landscape while preserving others.

Happy Marriages: Civilizing Domestic Life in Costa Rica, 1850–1950

Eugenia S. Rodríguez, History, University of Costa Rica

Research Grant, 1999, 2000

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The purpose of this research project is to analyze the main divorce tendencies in Costa Rica between 1800 and 1950, and to what extent ideals of and attitudes toward marriage, divorce, gender relationships, and domestic violence were modified.

During the colonial period and while the General Law of 1841 was in force (until 1887), only Christian marriage and church-approved or ecclesiastical divorce were legal. For the Catholic Church, marriage is a sacrament, a sacred undissolvable religious contract. Ecclesiastical divorce did not authorize dissolving the bond of matrimony, just separation without cohabiting. By the end of the nineteenth century, with the approval of civil marriage, separation, and divorce in the Civil Code of 1888, there is a secularization of the concept of marriage, conceived as a secular, civil, and temporary contract. As a result, couples that had infelicitous relationships had a legal instrument to dissolve their marriage, and the church lost its exclusive right to regulate the marital institution and sexual and domestic morality.

Regarding the grounds for civil divorce, the following remained: women’s adultery, one spouse’s attempt to kill the other, extreme cruelty, and felony. However, in comparison to the grounds for ecclesiastical divorce established in the Code of 1841, the Civil Code of 1888 added as cause for divorce a “husband’s scandalous concubinage.” Unlike female adultery, masculine adultery was not legally penalized. Therefore, even when it was demonstrated that the husband had been unfaithful, this was not sufficient ground for divorce. It had to be proven beyond doubt that the husband lived with his concubine, being a cause of public scandal, moral misconduct, and family disintegration. The Penal Code of 1941 eliminated female adultery as a felony and reduced sanctions for murders of passion. Finally, the Family Code (1974) introduced no-fault divorce and equality of spouses with respect to adultery as grounds for civil divorce.

In addition, the 1932 law introduced some further changes in the grounds for civil divorce. Although extreme cruelty was still considered grounds for divorce, the law eliminated felonies and added the husband’s attempt to prostitute his wife. Considering extreme cruelty but not serious offenses as grounds for divorce is the result of changes both in jurisprudence and of the fact that gender relationships and domestic violence were perceived as justifications to file for divorce. However, in all of the civil and penal codes, including the present one, a patriarchal gap has remained, since extreme cruelty and domestic violence are considered crimes similar to “injuries.”

It is obvious that there are not enough records to allow us to know with certainty how many couples were unhappy and to what extent they opted for separation. However, the evidence found in the 273 spousal-conflict complaints and in the 1,239 cases of ecclesiastical and civil divorce for the 1800–1950 period strongly suggests that, faced with an unhappy relationship that did not fulfill the expectations of a marriage for love and companionship, couples tended to opt more often to file for divorce to legally dissolve the bond of matrimony.

From 1800 to 1950, there was an increase in divorce suits in the 1840s. 62.2 percent of the total of divorce suits filed during this period—of which couples from San Jose filed 55.5 percent. In the whole Central Valley, the greatest number of cases was reported for the 1830–1850 period, especially in the five years between 1845 and 1850. This ascending rate of divorce took place within the larger expansion of the civil legal apparatus, which made it possible for women to have a legal instrument to denounce their husband’s abuses or to file for divorce. As a result, there was a visible and public sanction of marital conduct, a larger assimilation of the ideal of a loving and harmonious marriage, and an increase in suits due to spousal conflicts and divorce (Rodríguez 2000, 111–153).

Between 1851 and 1889, divorce suits kept ascending, the 1870s being the decade with the largest number of divorces.

Between 1851 and 1889, divorce suits kept ascending, the 1870s being the decade with the largest number of divorces, 40.2 percent out of a total of 281 suits for ecclesiastical divorce. Moreover, the increase in suits practically doubled between the 1860s (fifty-six suits) and the 1870s (131 suits). This upward trend is also corroborated in relation to the number of marriages and divorces filed. In fact, this ratio shifts from one divorce for each 16,104 marriages in the 1860s to one divorce for every 81.7 marriages during the 1870s. 

On the other hand, during the 1890–1950 period, there is a dramatic increase in civil divorce suits (98.9 percent out of 923 cases) and a dramatic decrease in ecclesiastical divorce suits (1.1 percent, only ten cases for the 1890–1919 period). This change may be explained, in part, by the serious conflict between the church and the state because of the anticlergy reform, which made it more difficult to present these suits. It could also have been influenced by Monsignor Thiel’s more aggressive policy for spreading the Catholic doctrine, the impact of the 1888 civil marriage, separation, and divorce reforms, and the Church’s propaganda and persecution campaigns against divorce. On the other hand, we find an increase in civil divorces, especially in the 1930s and 1940s (from 24.2 percent to 44.1 percent out of a total of 127 divorces by sentencing by repeal between 1900 and 1950).

Finally, this research questions some historical myths about gender relationships and domestic violence. These myths are: 1) that violence was considered a “natural” part of marriage relationships rather than a practice constructed and transformed historically and in everyday life; 2) that extreme cruelty of wife beating was always accepted by society; 3) that domestic violence was an exclusive practice of men from popular sectors; and 4) that wives were passive victims of patriarchal dominance incapable of resisting and impugning male dominance.

It is argued that the concept of domestic violence was constructed and transformed historically. The ecclesiastical and civil authorities allowed husbands to “correct” their wives with moderate violence if they would not submit. So, it was accepted as a “natural” condition of marriage and in the best interests of the family that wives had to endure verbal, emotional, economic, material and sexual abuse from their husbands. However, since the first half of the nineteenth century, such notions suffered a gradual reconceptualization by legally punishing the extreme cruelty exerted by husbands over their wives and the effects of violence, like injuries causing temporary or permanent physical incapacity to work. So, society has gradually sanctioned domestic violence more stringently. Nevertheless, recent studies have shown that the penal system and the existing regulations in the Penal Code of 1971 still underestimate violence against women, by emphasizing on physical violence. As a result, it could be stated that, as in the past, today a spouse’s abuse is still associated with “serious offenses.” Such restricted definition of domestic violence does not include the infliction of emotional, psychological, sexual and economic/material damage. Thus, most of the main kind of abuse and domestic violence are considered a “natural condition” of marriage.

Kidnapping in Colombia

Mauricio Rubio, Economics, University of Carlos III, Madrid

Research Grant, 2002

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The goal of the project is to analyze why kidnapping rates have been so high in Colombia. A brief history of kidnapping shows that it has two different roots. It was practiced in rural areas by some late “bandoleros” of the political violence period in the 1950s. On the other hand, urban kidnapping of foreigners—diplomats and CEOs—was imported from groups such as Tupamaros and Montoneros.

The relationship between drug activities and kidnapping has been quite complex. First, drugs facilitated the replacement of a few foreigners paying huge ransoms—the typical set-up during the 1970s—with a higher number of local victims paying less per incident. Drug lords buying haciendas had a side effect of pushing up rural property prices. This speculative trend displaced poor peasants and attracted urban middle classes to the countryside. The weekend house owner became the typical victim during the eighties, when kidnapping rates first increased significantly. Rural guerrilla groups were able to get kidnap resources with a negligible effect on agricultural production and without deteriorating relationships with peasants. The usual arrangement with rich farmers was extortion. Second, drug dealers gave a definitive stimulus to paramilitary groups as a private protection scheme against kidnapping. Third, some notorious drug lords began their criminal careers as kidnappers. Forth, drug traffickers have used kidnapping for purely political reasons and currently use it for collecting debts. Fifth, guerrilla groups easily shift between kidnapping/extortion and drugs to finance their military operations.

Indiscriminate kidnapping appeared when the middle class group of urban victims was besieged within the urban areas, by the mid ’90s. Kidnapping has been mostly linked to politically motivated groups. Colombian evidence does not corroborate the claim that kidnapping is just another business. One key issue for kidnappers is how to deal with agency problems. Several testimonies show that guerrilla leaders have been conscious of the need to indoctrinate their troops and to adopt highly centralized decision processes. Indoctrination diffuses personal responsibility and reduces the individual tendency to appropriate big cash ransoms. This may help explain why nonpolitical groups have not been able to kidnap in such a systematic manner as guerrilla groups.

Several testimonies show that guerrilla leaders have been conscious of the need to indoctrinate their troops and to adopt highly centralized decision processes. Indoctrination diffuses personal responsibility and reduces the individual tendency to appropriate big cash ransoms.

Upward turning points in the trend of aggregate statistical data—a first rise in the early ’80s and a soaring rate by the mid ’90s—are consistent with this brief history. However, two significant drops in the aggregate rate—from 1992 to 1995 and from 2001 to date—are not easily explained. A quite common hypothesis—that the first drop was due to an antikidnapping law—was not corroborated with time series procedures.

Cross-section data shows a pattern of high initial concentration and a later spreading of rates. Statistical models show that the capacity of local factors to explain regional differences of kidnapping rates is not only small but has been decreasing. Also, that the regional patterns of kidnapping are mainly explained by the geographical expansion of armed groups.

Micro-level data is scarce and the quality is dubious. Reaching former victims for interview or to answer a questionnaire has been an extremely difficult task. Interviews with negotiators show that preventive efforts have concentrated on trying to reduce the risk of being kidnapped, but no significant progress has been made on how to deal with the situation when it happens. No explicit evidence has been found about changes in the know-how of perpetrators besides the one associated with increased threat reputation and the bureaucratic buildup of rules and procedures.