As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, the role of outside countries in restoring peace has taken on heightened urgency.

Historically, third-party countries have been willing to spearhead diplomatic efforts to stop international conflicts. The United States, for example, after sending approximately $120 billion in aid to Ukraine under President Biden, has engaged in unilateral diplomacy and paused its aid under the second Trump administration, hoping to pressure Ukraine into a peace deal. 

Eric Min, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, was curious to learn whether such third-party efforts—in Ukraine and elsewhere—are effective in resolving conflict or might instead delay or even impede the desired outcome. With support from The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, Min collected daily-level data on battles and negotiations from ninety-two interstate wars between 1823 and 2003 to gauge the impact of third-party diplomacy.  

Min finds a consistent pattern in which failed negotiations are frequently followed by battlefield trends that strongly differ from those that preceded the talks. In some circumstances, diplomacy is used by the antagonists not to end wars but rather to help fight them. 

His investigation, Fighting and Bargaining Across Two Centuries of International Conflict, suggests that negotiations borne of external third-party pressure are not only likely to fail but also liable to be exploited in service of belligerents’ war efforts. He finds a consistent pattern in which failed negotiations are frequently followed by battlefield trends that strongly differ from those that preceded the talks. In some circumstances, he concludes, diplomacy is used by the antagonists not to end wars but rather to help fight them. 

The Arab-Israeli War of 1948–1949 is a useful case study. In mid-May 1948, when hostilities erupted, the nascent United Nations immediately called for a temporary ceasefire to allow mediator Folke Bernadotte time to engage in shuttle diplomacy. However, over the next several weeks, as he flew among the belligerents’ capital cities, attempting to assemble a comprehensive peace agreement, both Israel and the Arab states were secretly using this respite to rearm, remobilize, and regroup for more intense hostilities once the ceasefire ended.

Min’s research also identified, conversely, two conditions that predispose belligerents toward negotiating with a sincere intention of arranging peace: 

• First, the battlefield must exhibit a clear trend favoring one side. This provides information that is vital for all actors to reach a shared understanding of the war’s trajectory and likely outcome. 

• Second, external pressures to negotiate must be low. Historically, belligerents have hesitated to enter negotiations because doing so might be seen as a sign of weakness. Under heavy third-party pressure, they may be willing to participate in negotiations, but not in the interest of pursuing peace, instead leveraging diplomacy insincerely to promote their own war effort.

Min believes that initial diplomatic efforts during the Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrate his thesis. In early 2022, externally motivated talks in Belarus and Turkey exposed massive gaps in the belligerents’ bargaining positions, yet both sides agreed to create temporary humanitarian corridors for fleeing civilians. Initially, this development seemed promising. However, Russian forces’ repeated attacks on Ukrainians in these corridors suggested their commitment to peace was weaker than their aspiration to gain an upper hand in the war. 

Ultimately, the value of third parties is not in forging peace out of thin air but in standing ready to help arrange peace quickly when the belligerents are ready to stop fighting.

Amid the painful march of hostilities since then, as well as their drain on both military and political resources, the US under President Trump has moved to directly negotiate a settlement with Moscow and pressure Ukraine into its acceptance of such a deal. 

However, Min’s research suggests the Trump administration’s efforts to pressure Ukraine into peace talks are unlikely to produce a durable peace. Russia’s recent successes in retaking Kursk following Ukraine’s incursion last summer may indicate some momentum for its military effort. However, European leaders’ ambivalence towards providing aid to Ukraine leaves open significant uncertainty about the war’s medium-term trajectory. Consequently, any ceasefire arranged by third parties in this moment would be “unnatural.” Experience in other theaters suggests, moreover, that it would require massive third-party involvement to enforce, and would likely collapse over time, leading to further hostilities if third parties’ commitment to keeping the peace waned.

Ultimately, the value of third parties is not in forging peace out of thin air but in standing ready to help arrange peace quickly when the belligerents are ready to stop fighting. Such a conclusion may be depressing and conjure images of the international community idly watching more blood be shed instead of promoting diplomacy. Yet, given the evidence Min has collected, an undisciplined approach to peace may only make things worse. 

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